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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes an approach for failure mode identification in university-affiliated, small 
satellite programs.  These small programs have a unique set of risks due to many factors, 
including a typically inexperienced workforce, limited corporate knowledge, and a high student 
turnover rate.  Only those risks unique to small, student-run satellite programs are 
presented.  Technical risks and mitigation strategies of student and industry satellites are also 
discussed.  Additionally, several risk management strategies are explored, and the advantages 
and disadvantages of these risk-related tools and techniques are examined.   
 
To aid the process of risk identification in these particular programs, a master logic diagram 
(MLD) for small satellites was created to help identify potential initiating events that could lead 
to failures during the mission.  To validate the MLD, a case study and multiple experiments are 
presented and analyzed.  This master logic diagram approach is shown to provide an effective 
method of risk identification that can be easily adapted to small, student-run satellite programs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Universities are becoming more and more involved in small satellite projects.  This 
relatively new research field has students excited about space exploration they can be involved in 
right away, and schools are finding that satellite projects are a good way to teach students hands-
on satellite engineering.   
However, professors across the world have recognized that student satellites have many 
risks, and two of the most commonly mentioned are: 
1) Lack of experience in designing and testing satellites and in using risk management 
2) An organization and culture inherent to university programs to take on risks and to not 
manage those risks in the long term, especially from one group of students to the next 
This paper will investigate all risks related to student satellites and provide strategies that 
can be used to reduce these risks.   
1.2 Why Use Risk Management? 
A risk management process helps to promote mission success and safety in any engineering 
project.  While keeping the program’s objectives in mind, this process can help identify what 
might affect the outcome of the project in a negative manner.  It is important to identify critical 
end states of the satellite early so that design changes can be made to prevent these problems, or 
resources can be allocated to them.   
Without keeping track of and mitigating the effects of risks that threaten the mission, there is 
little hope of maintaining the performance, schedule, or budget; a management plan helps 
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allocate all three of these things in the risk reduction process.  A risk management plan can even 
decrease costs if started at the beginning of a design by devoting money to developing high risk 
items early on.  This will prevent schedule delays and hurried design fixes, both of which are 
costly and risky.   
A risk plan brings together all levels of engineers with the project management team.  
Making all personnel aware of failure modes throughout the program (and not just the dangers 
within their own work) can help to ensure the success of the mission as a whole.  In addition, 
continually monitoring risks and updating the team members on the status of the risks can help to 
keep the project on track. 
Aside from the benefits to the project, risk management should be used to help teach the 
students how satellite projects are run in industry.  Student satellites are mainly tools for teaching 
about the process of engineering design, of which risk management is an important aspect.  The 
students can learn to resolve both technical and programmatic risks through their involvement in 
the risk management process.   
1.3 Thesis Objectives and Outline 
The objective of this thesis is to research and analyze the programmatic and technical risks 
that student satellite projects face.  Then, a method for risk management, and specifically failure 
mode identification, will be developed, analyzed, and applied to a satellite project.   
Chapter 2 gives an overview of risk management and the five steps in the risk management 
process.  The scope and scale of student-run, small satellite programs are defined, and 
programmatic risks unique to student satellite projects are discussed.  These risks include 
funding, experience, staffing, direction, schedule, documentation, and recruitment.  Then, a study 
was done to collect information on the success rate of student satellites that have launched, and 
the technical failures are discussed.   In addition, the technical risks associated with industry 
satellites are analyzed and compared to the types of failures for small satellites.   
Chapter 3 first covers current risk management methods at universities.  About ten case 
studies of schools are presented to show the range of risk management plans that schools utilize.  
Taking these management plans into consideration, and looking at the risks unique to schools, 
suggestions are made for the improvement of programmatic risks in university risk management.  
In this section, it is noted that a framework for risk identification would help schools identify and 
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reduce risks.  Next, techniques for the mitigation of technical risks are presented.  Finally, 
advantages and disadvantages for alternative platforms versus satellite platforms for space and 
near-space missions are discussed. 
In Chapter 4, failure mode analysis options are presented and compared to each other.  The 
master logic diagram (MLD) is chosen as the best option to mitigate the programmatic and 
technical risks related to student projects.  The development of the MLD for small satellites is 
then discussed.  Uses of the master logic diagram are presented along with limitations of the 
MLD.  The benefits of the MLD, relating back to the programmatic risks facing small satellites, 
are given at the end of this chapter.   
The application of the MLD to the Mars Gravity Biosatellite (MGB), a project at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), is presented in Chapter 5.  The background of the 
Mars Gravity project and its previous risk management attempts are presented to show why the 
MLD was applied to the project.  Next, the MLD was compared with other common risk 
identification methods to see whether the MLD is in fact helpful in identifying risks.  The MLD 
was also compared to the percentages of failure modes per subsystem for on-orbit satellites in 
order to show that the MLD could identify not only the type, but also the number, of failure 
modes.  Then, the full risk management process, with the MLD fulfilling many of the steps, is 
discussed.  Finally, the results and benefits of applying the master logic diagram to the Mars 
Gravity project are presented. 
Chapter 6 gives a summary and details the contributions made in this thesis.  
Recommendations are also made for future work. 
 16 
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Chapter 2: Programmatic and Technical Risks for 
Student-Run and Industry Satellites 
This chapter will discuss risk management and the steps usually included in the risk 
management process in industry.  The definition for student-run, small satellites is given in 
greater detail, and both programmatic and technical risks facing student satellites will be 
discussed.  For comparison purposes, technical failures of industry satellites will also be 
presented.   
2.1 Risk Management Overview 
 
A risk is “a factor, thing, element, or course involving uncertain danger; a hazard.”1 
identifying something as a risk means that the combination of the likelihood of the event and the 
severity of its consequences threatens the mission.  Risk management is a broad term used to 
describe is a multi-step process to reduce both programmatic and technical risks.  Programmatic 
risks are those that threaten the program as a whole, including high turnover of staff, a tight 
schedule, etc.  Technical risks relate to components and subsystems.  Failure modes, such as 
equipment failure, short circuits, etc., of the satellite are some examples of technical risks. 
Risk management is the process of identifying issues that may be potential pitfalls to the 
success of a program and then creating and implementing a plan to mitigate those risks, assuring 
that the available resources are enough to facilitate mission success.  A risk management plan 
first requires understanding and identifying risks.  Then, it is necessary to analyze the 
probability, impact, severity, and urgency of the failure modes. Next, a mitigation strategy is 
developed to reduce risks, and decision points and testing strategies are identified to see whether 
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failures have been eliminated.  All risks, including ones that have been mitigated, are then 
monitored and updated throughout a project’s lifecycle.2  
2.1.1 Steps of Risk Management 
The first step of a risk management process is to understand the types of risks that a program 
faces.  Due to the variation in project size and type, each project requires a different level of 
sophistication in their risk management programs, and the team must decide what level of 
management is necessary for the success of their project.  When trying to understand the risks, 
engineers must consider what types of problems the program will face as well as the framework 
of the whole project.  By understanding such aspects as the mission objectives and scope, 
customer needs, acceptable risk levels, etc., each person will have a better view of what 
represents a risk for their project.   
Once it is understood what constitutes a risk and the context in which they must be 
mitigated, risks to the project must be identified.  The risk manager should specify what level of 
detail is necessary so that there is consistency within the program.  There are many strategies to 
identify and assess risk, which will be discussed in Sections 3.1 and 4.1, but a consistent 
technique must be chosen for the program.   
In traditional risk management programs, the risk team should assess the risks, analyzing the 
probability and severity of the risk occurring as well as the timeframe in which the risk must be 
handled.  Calculating the probability is often a difficult task given the lack of failure rate data 
and the early phase of the design.  However, given some preliminary data on failure rates of 
components or subsystems, this process can be included in the risk management plan from the 
beginning.  This data can be useful for allocating resources to the most probable failures.   
Teams should also analyze the severity, or impact on the project, of a risk occurring.  The 
impact on the mission’s goals and other parts of the project is an important factor in determining 
the priority for risk mitigation. If a risk impinges on another subsystem and the relationship is 
not adequately understood, serious problems could occur when the risk propagates through the 
program.  Understanding the severity of the risks will help to plan the monetary resources and 
the schedule of the mitigation plan according to the failure modes that will affect mission goals 
the most.  The timeframe of the risks should be noted and monitored to ensure that all risks are 
dealt with before its threat becomes more serious.  Note that all of these tasks take time and 
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money to implement, and they might not be necessary for all projects.  However, these are the 
traditional steps taken in risk management.   
After analyzing the risks, a mitigation approach is needed.  Depending on the level of risk of 
each item, the team can accept the risk, monitor the risk without immediate intervention, transfer 
the risk to another team, or implement a plan to lessen the impact or probability of the risk.  An 
action plan should include potential mitigation methods, the chosen approach, decision points, 
and tests to see whether the threat has been eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level.  To 
verify that a risk has been mitigated may involve testing, analysis, demonstration, or observation.  
Having a good grasp of the context of the risks (as mentioned in the first step) also helps when 
deciding what mitigation and testing strategies to use.  
The mitigation plan is not a static document; the risks must be tracked and updated on a 
predetermined schedule in regular reviews.  Continuous monitoring of risk allows for better 
control over the resources that are being used in the mitigation process.  Figure 1 shows the flow 
of risk management information.   
Throughout the risk management process, communication is a key element of ensuring a 
successful program.  All members of the team must be informed about the processes being used, 
and decisions must be thoroughly documented.  Strong support from the leaders of the project 
will help in all stages of risk management by providing clear guidelines and opening 
communication.  These leaders also need to direct the effort to formalize a risk management 
program, and the management should carry through by implementing the generated strategies. 
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Figure 1.  Risk Management Process Information Flow 
 
2.2 Definition of Student-run, Small Satellites 
To understand the context of this paper, it is necessary to define what a student-run small 
satellite program is.  Michael Swartout, from Washington University in St. Louis, gives an 
explanation of “university-class” satellites.3  The definition of a university-class (or student-run) 
satellite is one that is functional as a self-contained satellite, with inexperienced personnel doing 
a majority of the work.  In addition, the learning process and student training is an integral part 
of student-run satellite projects.  Throughout this paper, only programs that meet these criteria 
will be discussed as student-run satellites. 
The term “small” is used loosely in the satellite community and does not yet have a widely 
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supplier, claims that satellites less than 500 kilograms are small, but today’s small satellites are 
also distinct from small satellites from the days of early space exploration because of their 
complexity.  SSTL further breaks the satellites into classifications of minisatellite, nanosatellite, 
etc., but all of these have a mass less than 500 kilograms.   
Michael Swartout claims that mass is the wrong discriminator for satellites less than 60 
kilograms, and that schools should use volume because it is a better estimate of the true 
capabilities of the spacecraft.3  While it is a good point that classifying satellites into discrete 
groups such as the minisatellites and nanosatellites can be misleading, these distinctions are not 
of concern in this paper.  Here, it is more important to understand that the programs are student-
run and are generally smaller than programs in industry.  Most typical student satellites fall into 
the one kilogram CubeSat or 30 kilogram Nanosatellite programs, but satellites with masses up 
to a few hundred kilograms will be discussed.    
In summary, risk management is affected by the management as well as the size of the 
program.  Therefore, both of these factors are important considerations.  All satellites that are 
student-run will have risk management programs different from those done in the industry, and 
university-specific risk management plans can utilize the fact that their missions are smaller.  
Further sections in this paper will address these topics.   
2.3 Programmatic Risk Discussion  
While all satellite programs have threatening risks, small, student-run satellite programs 
have a unique set of risks associated with them.  Student and industry projects are fundamentally 
different, from the program to the component level, and it is important to understand their 
distinctions.  Because of their programmatic differences, unique university satellite risks occur in 
the areas of funding and competition, experience, staff, direction, schedule, documentation, and 
recruitment.  Professors and students across the world have mentioned these problem areas, and 
MIT suffers from the same issues in its student-run programs.       
2.3.1 Programmatic Differences between Industry and Student Satellites 
In general, the fundamental elements of commercial businesses or government programs are 
similar to those found at universities.  The biggest differences are related to the fact that 
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universities normally have “less” of all major resources, which leads to many risks for small 
satellite programs. 
In student-run programs, the scope and budget for the spacecraft are usually much smaller 
than in industry or government spacecraft.  As a result, the monetary consequences of failure are 
lower; therefore, risk is perceived differently.  While the student engineers working on a project 
are motivated by a desire to see the program succeed, the loss of the satellite is not as large of a 
financial burden and does not have the implications it would have for a satellite produced in 
industry.  However, losing a satellite could be detrimental to the long-term success of a school’s 
program, and risk should be taken seriously.  Risk poses different threats to university-based 
programs than to industry projects, and, therefore, university programs have unique 
requirements, varying acceptable levels of risk, and different mitigation strategies.   
In university-based satellite programs, the total number of people working on the program is 
less, so in turn, the subsystem teams consist of fewer people.  Smaller teams lead to shorter lines 
of communication, meaning risk mitigation could be implemented more quickly.  However, 
many universities tend to have a lax risk policy, which means that risk management is conducted 
in an ad hoc and informal basis.   
Since university teams are made up of mostly students, one major difference between 
university and industry programs is that a student’s primary focus is academic.  The students 
must split their time between class, homework, extracurricular activities, research, and possibly 
work.  With all of these activities (of which classes are usually the most important), research 
programs often do not receive the attention they need from students.  In addition, with a limited 
number of working hours that students devote to satellite projects, their time is usually spent on 
designing and building the hardware and software, and not on risk management.   
2.3.2 Funding Risks 
Student projects are run with less money, which limits design options, time, and available 
resources, including staff (both professors and students), components, etc.  Competing for 
funding as a university project can also be difficult because there are still limited resources for 
small satellites since the perceived value of these projects is low.    
Obtaining financial support in the first place can be difficult for universities.  This could 
mean that at the beginning of a project, there is little to no money to pay either students or 
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professors.  For staffing purposes, funding is especially critical to attract graduate students, who 
often do the bulk of the work.  The programmatic risks discussed throughout this paper will 
become more prevalent without proper funding for an adequate staff. 
  Funding also effects design decisions, testing procedures, schedule, and nearly every other 
aspect of designing and building a satellite.  Of course money is necessary for building and 
launching any satellite, but the budget of the program also drives the project and its schedule.  In 
addition, without adequate funding, student programs will have to rely on cheaper parts and 
methods, most likely resulting in very high risk.   
In many cases, student-run satellites compete for funding against similar university 
programs.  These competitions are usually solely focused on small satellites at universities, and 
they provide funding for a limited number of schools to continue their work.  To win this 
competition for funding, the schools must prove that they have an acceptable amount of risk for 
the type of mission planned.  One method used by the CubeSat Program at Cornell University5 
calculates risk based on Technology Readiness Levels, which they aim to make better by using 
hardware with flight-heritage and standard algorithms and processes.  Depending on the goal of 
the mission, this technique may or may not be suitable.  Risks can be inherent to the mission’s 
goals, but by showing that the team is aware of the risks and is working to minimize them as 
much as possible, these risks do not necessarily impede the project’s chance of funding. 
Some student-run satellites must compete against non-universities for funding.  In this type 
of competition, the schools must convince the funding source that sufficient risk mitigation 
strategies are in place to give better-than-expected results.  The combination of this acceptable 
level of risk and lower cost could comprise a good arrangement for the funding agency.  Low-
cost student satellites can be seen as a good investment if they have an acceptable level of risk. 
Competition for funding against any group is difficult for schools both with and without 
prior satellite design work, but it is even more difficult for the latter.  Creating and implementing 
a satellite program at a university takes great effort and expense, which increases the risks 
associated with their program.  
The lack of funding affects other aspects of the mission, including the schedule.  The 
physically small size of university satellites, as well as the prohibitive cost of being the primary 
satellite in a launch, leads many university satellites to be secondary payloads on a launch 
vehicle.  Opportunities to be a secondary payload may not be identified until relatively close to 
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the launch, making it difficult for the secondary payload team to obtain an appropriate launch 
opportunity.  This ties the development of the student project to that of the available primary 
object launches, making the spacecraft development fit a (potentially) tight schedule and, 
therefore, increasing technical risk.  On the other hand, the satellite may have to wait until a ride 
is available, which increases the risk of components malfunctioning as well.   
2.3.3 Risks Related to Experience 
With little to no formal training or guidance, students lack the experience to identify risk and 
suggest mitigation strategies.  Since students, especially undergraduates, work the most with the 
subsystems, they are best positioned to make observations about risk, but they usually do not 
have the experience to perform tasks related to risk. A method such as a risk template (see 
Section 4.2) would be useful as both a teaching aid and a design tool for these students. 
The lack of experience is compounded by the short period that students usually participate in 
a satellite project.  When students join a project, both their general subject knowledge and their 
familiarity with the project are usually minimal.  The learning curve to obtain general knowledge 
and become familiar with a project uses a large portion of the time a student has to work on the 
program.  Students can join projects later in their undergraduate career to minimize this learning 
curve, but it can take a couple of semesters to fully catch up with the rest of the team, depending 
on the progress of the project.   
Students have the advantage of being highly motivated and energetic, driven by the 
enthusiasm of being part of an aerospace project.  The desire to learn and master the material 
helps mitigate some of the negative effects that lack of experience brings to the project.  
However, this optimism, coupled with inexperience, can lead to a lack of focus.6  It is necessary 
to balance the students’ experience and energy with set goals and deadlines.  
2.3.4 Staffing Risks 
There are five main components to the staff that work on university satellites – 
undergraduate students, graduate students, university staff (such as technicians), professors, and 
industry professionals.  These groups differ in responsibilities and size, but most programs are 
set up so that undergraduates are the largest group, and they work on specific tasks within 
subsystems.  Graduate students act as subsystem leaders and managers, bringing the different 
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teams together.  Technicians can be employed to fabricate equipment, run tests and experiments, 
and, in general, help the students throughout the design and development phase.  The 
professor(s) and industry counterparts oversee the project from a systems- and program-level 
perspective.   
One of the largest problems for these programs is the fact that a student must focus on 
classes, which can make it difficult to devote enough time to the satellite project.  The students 
must split their time between class, homework, extracurricular activities, research, and possibly 
work. With all of these activities, research programs often do not receive the continued and 
focused attention they need from students.  Without a set of dedicated students or funding 
available to pay personnel, it can be hard to guarantee that the project will have people with all 
the required skills, which also increases risk.  It is difficult to mitigate this risk, so it may be 
necessary to deal with this issue while trying to reduce risks in other areas.  
In addition, much of the work being done on the development of a small satellite is focused 
on design and fabrication, which would not be suitable for doctoral research.  Having doctoral 
students on the project helps because they can be on the project longer than most students, which 
helps to maintain consistency and oversight.  However, because of the type of work performed 
on many small satellites, it may be difficult to find PhD students to work on small satellite 
projects. 
Turnover and losing students after graduation makes it difficult to keep stability in a project.  
By the time a student has enough knowledge to be fully productive in a satellite program, they 
are approaching graduation.  This is also a problem since students, especially undergraduates, are 
inexperienced and bring few previously-acquired skills to the project.   
Many tasks have only one person assigned to them.  These single-string workers pose a 
serious problem to any project because if that one person becomes too busy or leaves the project 
suddenly, the job they were assigned may be delayed while a new worker is found and trained.  
Having single-string workers also requires a large learning curve/hand-off time when the next 
person  joins, delaying the schedule if this was not factored in.   Documentation when students 
leave is also an issue, and that will be discussed in Section 2.3.7. 
Oftentimes, a core group of student managers keep the entire project team together.  These 
students usually have more education and design experience and have been with the program for 
a number of terms.  Therefore, this small group of people has many responsibilities across the 
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breadth of the project, and these people need to be careful of burn out.  However, the 
management should aim to stay with the project over a number of years to provide continuity and 
corporate memory.   
Projects that occur in a class instead of as an extracurricular activity can have even more 
challenges than the ones listed above, but they also have other benefits.  These classes have from 
one to, at most, three semesters to work on the project before it must be completed or handed 
over.  These timeframes lead to either short development and production time or a project that 
will most likely be given to an entirely new workforce, incurring not only documentation risks, 
but also learning curves for a whole team.  These classes do have the advantage that the students’ 
grades are tied to their work on the project; ensuring most of the students are devoted to its 
mission for a specified number of hours per week.   
In addition to the problems a project faces using student workers, there are often few paid, 
professional employees working on the project.  The expense of employing technicians or 
professors may prove too high for small projects, leading to issues with oversight, technical help, 
direction, etc.  A dedicated staff, whether it be undergraduates, graduates, or staff, is key to 
maintaining a student project’s direction and corporate knowledge.  Some turnover is acceptable 
and necessary, but there are more advantages to keeping a long term, committed group of people 
on the project.   
2.3.5 Lack of Direction 
As in industry, student-run projects oftentimes have many sources of requirements.  In these 
fast-paced, understaffed projects, it is hard to devote the time and proper attention that 
requirements need.  Without proper direction, students will get sidetracked from the critical 
design work, or they might not believe that the satellite really will fly.  In this case, it is 
speculated that the students could make poor design decisions because they don’t think that the 
satellite has a chance to get to orbit.  On the other hand, with too many directions and goals that 
are too lofty, it has been noted at multiple universities that their projects will have a difficult time 
making design decisions and completing the mission successfully.   
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2.3.6 Schedule Risks 
As mentioned previously, schedules are tied closely with money, personnel, and available 
resources.  At a school, setting a schedule can be difficult because the number of hours that 
students have available to work varies each week.  High turnover is also an issue when 
scheduling because the average student involvement is much shorter than the development time 
of the project, and the turnover rate is difficult to predict when setting schedules.  In addition, the 
students and professors have little corporate knowledge of how long a certain job will take.  
Companies usually have experience with similar projects, making the projections of how many 
person-hours should be devoted to each assignment easier.  Without this knowledge, it is harder 
for student projects to determine how long a task will require and how many jobs will be 
completed in a given amount of time.   
Yet, staying on schedule is important for both the project’s success and for the school’s 
reputation.  The program needs to meet strict deadlines throughout the design, and if the project 
deviates from these, it could delay the launch, or miss the launch all together.  A university can 
also increase its credibility by staying on schedule, making it more likely for partners and 
funding agencies to invest in a school’s projects in the future.   
Many small satellite projects have a short development time – one to two years in length – 
and don’t have a full time staff.  While small satellites should take less time to build due to their 
lower complexity, the issues of timeframe and staffing makes their design and development 
rushed.  For example, a satellite program at Utah State University had problems with their 
telemetry and command subsystem four times, but they never looked at the failure modes 
because there was neither the time nor the personnel.6 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, small satellites are usually a secondary payload on a launch 
vehicle.  Many launches have unscheduled delays, pushing the deadline back for the satellite 
delivery date, but these changes cannot be planned for.  Teams, though, often make quick fixes 
to problems that could have been solved differently if they had more control over their schedule.  
While quick fixes are a problem in industry and for primary payloads, it is even more of an issue, 
and it’s more common, for the secondary satellites because they have no control over the launch. 
Since small satellites are often subject to fast-paced development and short schedules, not all 
risk management techniques are applicable to these projects.  Both assistance in identifying risk 
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and streamlined methods to analyze a satellite’s risks are needed to better study these types of 
projects. 
2.3.7 Documentation 
In small projects, where the lines of communication are shorter, it is tempting to be lax on 
documentation requirements.  However, because of the high turnover and need for thorough 
explanation to new students, keeping track of work is critical to the success of a student project.  
Improper documentation is a risk area because without proper records, there is a high likelihood 
of losing valuable research and information, including critical items such as rationale and 
assumptions.  Since students often enter and leave a program in two years or less, a major risk is 
the handover of information to other team members.  Furthermore, documentation is not exciting 
and students are not motivated to put the time in to be thorough.  It is difficult, but necessary, to 
find time in a student’s schedule to follow through with the required knowledge transfer.   
After a mission is completed, whether it was successful or had failures, it would be best for 
the team and for the small satellite community for the school to document its lessons learned.  
Post-mission documentation may be even more difficult to enforce because the team splits apart, 
and students and staff move on to other projects.  If there is no funding leftover, there is little 
motivation for people to continue work on documentation other than for the benefit of future 
students, and that may not be a strong enough reason.   
2.3.8 Recruitment 
With the high turnover rate of students, recruitment on an extracurricular project is a large 
part of the management team’s role.  A recruitment drive is needed once to twice per year, on 
average, and students must devote many hours to advertising, information sessions, interviewing, 
etc.  Due to all these activities, a substantial amount of time is spent recruiting new members.   
Bringing young students onto the project is time-consuming because they sometimes lack 
the education and experience required to work on satellite projects.  It is important, though, to 
bring these students on board because they could be with the project for a long time, giving 
continuity to the program.   
Signing up experienced students can also be difficult because the students that are old 
enough to have experience are usually committed to other activities.  In most cases, programs 
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will take on younger members and train them as a way of obtaining the necessary workforce, but 
this strategy involves a lot of effort and time from the current team members.   
2.4 Technical Risk Discussion 
In addition to programmatic risks, student satellites also face traditional technical risks.  This 
section will investigate whether student satellites are prone to certain types of failures and how 
these programs may be able to learn from industry experience when dealing with technical risks.  
However, despite the benefit of sharing failures, many programs, especially in industry, do not 
usually make failure information available.  Most satellite programs seem reluctant to share 
information about failures in their systems because discussing these failures can increase the 
perceived risk associated with a company or university.  It also highlights management and/or 
technical faults in a company, even though all programs have these issues.  Therefore, most 
programs do not like to discuss what went wrong with a satellite program.   
This section looks at the data available that is most relevant to the study of failure modes of 
student satellites.  First, technical student satellite failures will be discussed.  Second, the results 
of studies on industry failures from both large and small programs will be presented.  Lastly, the 
differences between the types of satellites will be compared.  Where possible, failures will be 
identified at the subsystem level (propulsion, power, etc.) to show relevant trends in the types of 
failure in spacecraft. 
2.4.1 Sources of Information 
To find more information on satellite failures, there are a couple of sources available to the 
public.  None are perfect for gathering data on types of failures, but they are useful for getting 
information on a specific satellite or a specific type of failure.  Table 1 has information on some 
of the sources of satellite information that are available online for public use.   
2.4.2 Student Satellite Technical Failures 
This section will discuss the information available on technical failures of student satellites.  
Table 2 shows 95 student-designed satellites from all over the world that have been launched 
through April 2007.  Due to the additional difficulty of designing flight hardware for space, the 
satellites in this list must have been designed to operate in the space environment and not solely 
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in an orbiting space lab.  The information for this list was gathered from the sources in Table 1 
and other websites, as listed in the References (“Ref”) column. 
Table 1.  Public Sources of Satellite Information 
 
Webpage Title Purpose Searchable? 
The Satellite 
Encyclopedia7  
Description of about 2500 satellites, some 
information on failures 
Yes 
Satellite News Digest8 Timeline and list of satellite failures Yes 
Mission and Spacecraft 
Library9 
Not recently updated and little to no failure 
information 
Not working 
Airclaims SpaceTrak10 Subscription site that has failure rate information 
but is mostly used by insurance companies 
No 
Encyclopedia 
Astronautica11 
Information on satellite missions and some failures Yes 
Gunter’s Space Page12 Information on national and international satellites, 
includes technical information and some mission 
outcomes 
Yes 
NASA Lessons Learned13 Official, reviewed lessons learned and 
recommendations from NASA projects 
Yes 
Michael's List of Cubesat 
Satellite Missions14 
Partial list of student satellite missions and some 
outcomes 
No 
The Radio Amateur 
Satellite Corporation15 
Summary of the status of amateur satellites, 
including some university satellites 
Yes 
 
To categorize the successes and failures of the satellites, the duration of contact with the 
satellites was noted, and if possible, the reason for the failure was also recorded.  Many of the 
satellites did not make it to orbit because of a launch vehicle failure (“LV failure”), and others 
were unable to be contacted once they reached their orbits (“No contact”).  Satellites that, 
because of a failure, could only be contacted intermittently throughout the mission or failed 
within the first few weeks of the mission, are categorized under “Some contact.”  Finally, 
satellites that were fully functional on orbit, at least for the majority of the mission goal length, 
were put under “Full contact.”   
Not including the satellites with launch vehicle failure, the following failure rates result: 57 
(78%) of them were able to be fully contacted, nine (12%) satellites had some contact but 
premature failure, and seven (10%) had no contact.  This data is shown in Figure 2. 
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Table 2.  University-class Satellites and On-orbit Status 
 
Satellite Name LV failure 
No 
contact 
Some 
contact 
Full 
contact Reason Ref 
UoSat-1 (UO-9)    X  12 
UoSat-2 (UO-11)    X  12 
NUSat    X  11 
WeberSAT (WO-18)    X  12 
KITSAT-1 (KO-23)    X  11 
KITSAT-2 (KO-25)    X  11 
BremSat    X  7 
Falcon Gold    X  7 
Sputnik 40 (RS-17)    X  7 
Sputnik 41 (RS-18)    X  4 
PANSAT (PO-34)    X  12 
SUNSAT (SO-35)    X  7 
KITSAT-3    X  11 
Tsinghua 1    X  4 
Saudisat 1A    X  12 
Saudisat 1B    X  12 
Saudisat-1C (SO-50)    X  15 
SaudiSat 2    X  16 
UNISAT 1    X  12 
UNISAT 2    X  16 
Kolibri-2000    X  15 
MOST    X  17 
STSAT-1    X  16 
UNISAT 3    X  16 
TUBSAT-A    X  12 
TUBSAT-N/N1    X  12 
DLR-Tubsat    X  12 
LAPAN-Tubsat    X  12 
Maroc-Tubsat    X  12 
Mozhayets 3 (RS-20)    X  12 
Mozhayets 4 (RS-22)    X  15 
Opal (OO-38)    X  7 
Techsat 1B (GO-32)    X  7 
Echo    X  15 
HITSat    X  15 
CP3    X  15 
Libertad 1    X  15 
Sapphire (NO-45)    X  18 
PCSat2    X  18 
MARScom    X  18 
RAFT    X  18 
ANDE    X  18 
MidSTAR-1    X  18 
QuakeSat    X  12 
UWE-1    X  12 
XI-IV (CO-57)    X  12 
XI-V (CO-58)    X  12 
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CUTE-1 (CO-55)    X  12 
CUTE 1.7 (CO-56)    X  12 
GeneSat-1    X  12 
Naxing-1 (NS-1)    X  19 
FalconSat-3    X Fixed Problem: Software 20 
PCSat 1 (NO-44)    X Degradation: Power 18 
CP4    X  22 
LIBERTAD-1    X  22 
MAST    X  22 
Cape1    X Battery Failure, works in sun 22 
SSETI Express (XO-53)   X  Power 12 
JAWSAT (WO-39)   X  Communication, Power 3, 7 
SEDSAT-1 (SO-33)   X  Communication, Power 7 
TUBSAT-B   X  Radiation 3 
UNAMSAT-B   X  Power, Thermal 3,12  
ASUSat (AO-37)   X  Power 12 
FalconSat-1   X  Power 12 
Munin   X  Command & Data Handling 17 
AAU Cubesat   X  Communication, Power 12 
NCube2  X    14 
DTUsat  X    14 
CANX-1  X    14 
Thelma  X    7 
Louise  X    7 
JAK  X    7 
Mozhayets 5  X   LV-Satellite not separated 7 
Techsat 1 X     7 
FalconSat-2 X     12 
UNAMSAT-A X     12 
UNISAT 4 X     12 
YES X     12 
3CornerSat X     21 
ION X     14 
SACRED X     14 
KUTEsat X     14 
ICE Cube 1 X     14 
ICE Cube 2 X     14 
SEEDS X     14 
HAUSAT 1 X     14 
NCube1 X     14 
MEROPE X     14 
CP1 X     14 
CP2 X     14 
RINCON 1 X     14 
Mea Huaka’i X     14 
Baumanets 1 X     12 
PicPot X     12 
AlMASat-1 X     17 
CP3     Not heard from yet 22 
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Figure 2.  Failure Rates of Student-Run, Small Satellites, Excluding Launch Failures 
 
For most of the satellites, no information was available on the reason for the failure, except 
for the “Some contact” group.  In this case, eight out of the ten satellites reported failures due at 
least in part to the power subsystem.  Two schools identified power and communication as the 
reasons for failure, one satellite’s failure was Command and Data Handling (C&DH), and 
another had thermal problems, probably due to launch conditions in Russia.  This information is 
important to study in order to understand what is causing small satellites to fail.  It would be best 
to have information on all failures for the satellites, no matter what the final status of the 
satellite.  However, this information is not readily available. 
It is a significant trend that 80% of the satellites that had at least partial success failed due to 
power considerations.  The fact that the power subsystem was identified as the failure in so many 
satellites could be because power failures may be easier to detect, or they may often be the real 
root cause.  To better understand the failures these satellites are having and how programs can 
reduce the risk of power subsystem failures, the satellite with these failures will be discussed in 
more detail.  
FalconSat-112 initially worked on orbit.  However, cadets working in the ground station a 
few weeks into the mission found that the satellite’s power system was not working properly and 
could not charge the batteries while in the sunlight.  They could not solve the problem, and the 
mission was terminated early. 
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ASUSat12 deployed properly, and the telemetry showed that the student-designed satellite 
components appeared to operate as designed.  Then, half of a day into the mission, the satellite 
team received telemetry that there was a critical problem in the power subsystem that caused the 
solar panels to not charge the batteries.  From the reports, it is unclear where the exact problem 
was other than in the power subsystem.   
SSETI Express12 also failed about half of a day into the mission.  This satellite experienced 
problems with excess power dissipation due to a short-circuited transistor, which caused the 
batteries to not get sufficient charge.   
JAWSAT had two sources claim two different failures for this mission.  No information is 
available from the JAWSAT team, and their website is out of date and does not include any 
information about the on-orbit performance.  One source says that the main battery failed after 
launch7 and the other reports that it was a communication failure (either due to the transmitter or 
receiver)3.  The failure may have been tied to both of these issues, but too little information is 
available to determine the root cause of the failure.   
UNAMSAT-B had both thermal and power issues.  Apparently, the satellite was not 
designed for the launch conditions in Russia, and the spacecraft’s uplink oscillator was too cold 
before launch.  Once the condition was noticed, the spacecraft could not be contacted in time to 
change the battery charging parameters for the cold conditions.3,12  Due to this thermal and 
design problem, the power system failed.   
PCSat lasted quite a long time in a semi-degraded state.  The batteries became so weak that 
the satellite could not downlink anything during eclipse.  Then, the satellite was found to work 
only during full sun or certain eclipses once every several months.18   It was determined that the 
team did not plan for the worst case scenario of the need for instantaneous power during a re-
boot from a reset condition.  So the root cause may not have been power, but the design of the 
power system did not allow them to get out of this condition.  Their lesson learned is that the 
start-up recovery mode must use low enough power so that the spacecraft can finish fully 
charging the batteries in the sun before an eclipse, so that the system does not reset while in 
eclipse due to low power.  Teams should think about and discuss what tasks are necessary to 
design to the worst case scenario.23   
The AAU CubeSat had an unidentified problem with the satellite transmitter, which resulted 
in only a small amount of data able to be downlinked due to a weak signal.  This end state was 
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most likely due to faulty antenna deployment, with two out of four antenna segments short 
circuiting.  At about three months into the mission, the team was just beginning to have two-way 
communication again when the batteries failed because they could not store enough energy to 
continue operations.24  
Prior to launch, SEDSAT-17,25  indicated potentially low solar panel performance, but there 
was nothing the program could do at that point due to time and funding.  However, they had a 
long standing philosophy to have smart software that would manage the system at whatever 
performance level they got on orbit, and this was successful.  The satellite developed power 
problems three days after launch because the battery capacity was not as high as expected.  
However, the major failure was the transponder on board because the ground stations could here 
the satellite, but they could not communicate with it to upload further commands and updates.  
Since this occurrence, control of the mission has not been regained.   
These missions show the known types of failures experienced by small satellites so that 
schools can see the information available on technical risks for student satellites, which come 
from both hardware/software failure and inadequate design.  While exact root causes were not 
determined for many of these missions, it is apparent that battery power is a main error source.  
Batteries may often fail because of their chemical nature and the ease with which they wear out.  
Failure to have adequate charge in the batteries could be due to the wiring, physical design, 
under-sizing, electrical power system, too much depth of discharge, etc., so universities should 
spend more resources on careful design and testing of this subsystem.  The root cause of power 
failures might also be attributed to another subsystem, if for example the attitude control system 
could not keep the solar arrays in full sun, but there is not enough information to determine this.  
In any case, the power subsystem affects almost all other subsystems and, therefore, must be 
designed and tested carefully.   
Mark Maier, a former professor at the University of Alabama-Huntsville, shared some 
thoughts on why power failures occur more in student satellites.25  Most importantly, power 
systems are typically built by students with poor resources (as compared to industry satellites).  
The solar panels are constructed at the school in many cases, and they are not durable or very 
reliable.  University projects cannot typically afford fully qualified space batteries, so they adapt 
another battery system, and reliability is likely to be low.  Power electronics are harder to design 
that it might seem, and in addition, there are no good guides and few experts for power 
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electronics.  Also, power systems are fundamental to the spacecraft, so if it fails, the mission is 
over.   
Another reason for common power system failures could be that this part of the satellites 
must handle large amounts of current, which stresses the electronic components and requires a 
lot of heat dissipation.  Some piece of the power system is always turned on in, which also 
increases stress to this subsystem.   
In contrast, communication systems, such as radios, are often procured and integrated as 
professionally built units.  Structures are easy to build and test, and thermal demands are not very 
high on small satellites.  Therefore, power subsystems are the student satellite weak point. 
Swartout also investigated student (and some amateur) satellites and found 62 satellites that 
he identified as university-class satellites.  Sixteen of these satellites (25.8%) failed prematurely 
(before the end of the nominal mission).3  This information is different than that presented in 
Figure 2 because the types and number of satellites and the definition of failure between the 
studies varied.   
Swartout also points out that certain subsystems are often not the primary cause of failures 
in a satellite.  These include Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) hardware for such things as 
structures, thermal systems, batteries, and electronics.3  Here, Swartout is saying that the actual 
hardware does not fail, while it is unclear in the university satellites discussed above what the 
actual root error source was – it might not have been the hardware, but it could have been the 
design of the battery or the rest of the power subsystem that failed.  Therefore, Swartout’s 
analysis can supplement the data from Table 2 when studying types of failures in the power 
subsystem.  In addition, structural failure could be low due to required pre-launch vibration and 
static testing.  The short mission duration of many of these satellites is another reason that COTS 
parts work well for student satellites – they don’t need to be radiation hardened or have very long 
life expectancies.  
Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd26 (SSTL) is somewhat of a bridge between the university 
and industry satellite program because they first started as a student-based group at the 
University of Surrey, but they currently make more advanced small satellites as a commercial 
enterprise.  Their experience shows that mechanisms, power systems with high capacity, and 
propulsion systems often fail in general satellites.  This anecdotal information only partially 
agrees with that from Swartout and Table 2.  Swartout claims that batteries do not fail, while 
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SSTL claims that power systems do fail.  These claims are not totally contradictory because there 
is more to a power system than just a battery, and Swartout mentions that the COTS hardware is 
reliable, while SSTL cautions the use of high capacity systems, many of which are not COTS 
products.  Other than power failures, Table 2 does not have much information on failure modes, 
so it is hard to compare the other evidence from SSTL. 
With such little information, though, it is still too early to draw conclusions on whether 
inferences on failure rate or subsystem failure tendency can be drawn from the data collected 
thus far.  However, the studies agree that failures occur due to the complexity of spacecraft 
systems that are difficult to model or test on the ground.   
2.4.3 Industry Failures 
Small, student-run satellites might not be directly comparable to general industry satellites 
because of the inherent differences in their programs.  However, it is interesting to see what the 
similarities and differences are between these two classes of satellites.   
A few studies have been done to look at the failure rate of industry satellites.  It can be very 
difficult to attain information from industry due to proprietary reasons and other information 
barriers.  In addition to the same problems as industry, government programs also cannot share 
much information due to its many classified programs.  In addition, all programs are somewhat 
tentative to share information on their failures for credibility reasons.   
To try to remedy this situation, The Aerospace Corporation has begun collecting data on 
satellite failures.  The Aerospace Corporation is a federally funded research and development 
center (FFRDC) that was created in the 1960 for the United States Air Force.  It is a nonprofit 
corporation that provides both scientific and objective engineering support for the nation’s 
launch, space, and related ground systems.   
The Aerospace Corporation created the Space Systems Engineering Database (SSED) in 
order to organize and maintain many types of engineering data collected since the space program 
began.  In 2002, SSED claimed to contain over 12,000 space system anomalies, which 
Aerospace uses to analyze space vehicle failures for its customers.27 The SSED is still not 
complete because of the space community’s unwillingness to share this information.  In addition, 
the SSED and a few other databases at NASA and in industry are not for distribution to the 
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general public.  The next sections, though, discuss papers on industry satellite failure rates, and a 
few of these papers were based on information from the SSED.   
 
2.4.3.1 Large Industry Programs 
 
One area that has been a focus of study is general satellite failures from the commercial side 
and the government.  The studies below discuss the failure rates and failure types for a number of 
different classes of satellites.  Section 2.4.4 will compare the results of industry project failure 
rates and student satellite failure rates.   
In 2002, a study was done on 1,080 commercial communication geosynchronous satellites 
that had been launched prior to 2001.28  Data was used from the Public Record Satellite Anomaly 
Data Base, which is only for geosynchronous satellites and does not seem to be widely available 
any more.  This study looked at the severity of the failure as well as the subsystem in which the 
failure occurred. 
When considering failures where the spacecraft was permanently disabled, we can gather 
information on the likelihood for subsystems to fail for this particular class of satellites.  The 
study found that most failures are due to high propulsion maneuvers (57% of catastrophic 
failures), such as launch, perigee kick motors, and apogee kick motors, of which the latter two 
don’t pertain to university missions.   
The next highest failure rate (15% of catastrophic failures) was in the Attitude Control 
Subsystem.  The failures in this category were caused mostly by electronics and software issues 
as well as sensors and momentum wheels.  Two other high failure areas include the Propulsion 
Subsystem (7% of catastrophic failures, usually from a leak or propellant depletion) and the 
Power Subsystem (6% of catastrophic failures, often due to electrical shorts). 
A few subsystems had very few failures of any severity.  These include the Structural 
subsystem (excluding mechanisms) and the Thermal subsystem.  In addition, few errors were 
contributed to Operators, but this number might be low due to human influence and the 
proclivity to not report human error.  This information is shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Geosynchronous Satellite Subsystem Failure Rate prior to 2001 
 
Another 2002 paper looked at failure rates by subsystem primarily for 260 US Government 
and civil satellites from 1980-2002.29  The space vehicles used in this study are Earth-orbiting 
spacecraft that were contacted after launch vehicle separation and survived at least the first day.  
In addition, they had to have a mass of greater than 100 kilograms with a design life of longer 
than one year to be included in the study.  Failures were categorized by what caused the End of 
Life (EOL) – in other words, what caused the satellite to be inoperable (whether it resulted in the 
payload not working or the satellite not being able to support the mission requirements any 
longer).  In general, more than 25% of space vehicles in this study that got to their intended orbit 
and functioned on the first day failed before they reached the end of their design lives.  The data 
from this study is shown in Figures 4 and 5.  
This study shows that the payload causes around 35% of mission-ending failures for Civil 
spacecraft and 26% for Military ones.  Guidance, Navigation, and Control causes 28% of Civil 
satellite EOL failure and 24% of Military spacecraft failure, with reaction wheels and gyros 
being a root cause for a large portion of the failures.  The Power subsystem contributes to 26% of 
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Civil failures and around 18% of Military ones.  The Propulsion subsystem ends just 2% of Civil 
missions but nearly 20% of Military satellites. 
In the GN&C area, a few specific items emerge as major contributors to EOL.  In both Civil 
and Military missions, reaction wheels and gyroscopes were main contributors.  A second large 
source of failure, for Military satellites in particular, is running out of fuel to perform guidance 
and attitude control.  If this occurs before the end of the design life, it is most likely due to an 
under-design of the system or an overuse of fuel by the operators; however, it could also be due 
to a hardware or software malfunction that caused the expenditure of too much fuel.   
For this category of satellites, the following subsystems rarely contributed to EOL failures: 
Structures and Mechanisms (no mission ending failures), Thermal Control (<1% Civil, none for 
Military), Commands & Data Handling (4% Civil, 2% Military), and Telemetry, Tracking, and 
Control (4% Civil, 10% Military).   
 
GN&C, 28%
Propulsion, 2%
Power, 26%
Payload , 35%
C&DH, 4%
Thermal, 1%
Communication, 
4%
GN&C
Propulsion
Power
Communication
Payload 
C&DH
Thermal
 
Figure 4.  Civil Satellites Subsystem Failure Rates from 1980-2002 
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Figure 5.  US Government Satellites Subsystem Failure Rates from 1980-2002 
 
Reliability engineering has shown that throughout all types of industry, components tend to 
fail in a “bathtub curve” manner.  This is characterized by early “infant mortality” that starts high 
and then decreases, a longer period of relatively constant failure rates, and then an increasing 
failure rate, often due to wear out.  This study agrees with the “bathtub curve” result, with high 
failure rates during the first 90 days to one year, low failure rates from year one to six, and 
increasing end of life failures between years seven and ten.  There were fewer satellites with 
design lives longer than ten years, so the failure rate decreases after year ten.  
In 2003, further investigation into Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) failures in 
764 satellites launched from 1990-2001 was done.30  Satellite anomalies investigated include 
those from the US, Europe, Canada, and Japan that failed prior to the end of the design life.  
Here, a mission critical failure is defined as “the premature loss of a satellite or the loss of its 
ability to perform its primary mission during its design life.”30  GN&C is defined quite broadly 
and includes on-orbit subsystems that are directly involved in GN&C, such as the Attitude 
Control System (ACS), the Propulsion System, and software relating to the satellite’s flight 
dynamics.  It also includes all ground operations relating to GN&C, including trajectory 
planning, navigation, etc.   
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Here, 35 (29%) of all the anomalies in this satellite category were due to GN&C 
components, and 13 anomalies (37%) were recorded that resulted in total loss of the satellite.  
This report will focus on total loss of the satellite because it is unclear whether the other 
anomalies listed were mission critical.  Separately, the ACS had approximately 23% of the 
mission ending anomalies, Payload had 20%, C&DH had 17%, and the Electrical Power 
Subsystem had about 14%.  Data for these subsystem failures is shown in Figure 6. 
Hardware contributes to the majority of the failures, while design, software, operations, and 
verification also have some influence on failures.  The space environment causes the least 
number of failures when classified in this manner, and there are also some unknown failures that 
can’t be placed into categories.  When looking at hardware, seven anomalies occurred with 
reaction wheels, three each for pyrovalves, thrusters, and processors, two each for gyroscopes 
and GPS receivers, and one for tanks, Earth sensors, and nutation dampers.  While these numbers 
are not very large, making it hard to deduce definite patterns, we can see that reaction wheels are 
again a large cause of failure.   
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Figure 6.  Satellite Subsystem Failures from 1990-2001, with a Focus on GN&C Failures 
 
 
Pyrovalves seem to cause problems because of the mechanical or electrical shock generated 
by the pyrovalve.  In each of these cases mentioned in the paper, the pyrovalve anomaly caused a 
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total loss of the mission.  Also to note, gyroscopes are lower on the list as compared to the 2002 
Military/Civil study.  One reason might be that gyros have been used less in recent years for 
attitude determination, so any gyro failures tend to result in partial performance loss or 
interruption in the mission rather than total failure.     
This GN&C study shows that this set of satellites also contributes to the “bathtub curve” 
analogy; 51% of all anomalies (and 50% of GNC anomalies) occurred within the first 10% of the 
mission design life.  
In summary, studies were performed on the reasons for mission ending errors in satellite 
design.  These reports only cover the technical aspect and show that subsystems associated with 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control (including ACS) tend to end satellite missions before their 
design lives are over.  How these failures relate to smaller programs as well as risk management 
will be discussed in Section 2.4.4.  
 
2.4.3.2 Small Industry Programs 
 
With the introduction of “Faster, Better, Cheaper” (FBC) in the aerospace industry, 
particularly at NASA, there has been a recent flux of satellites in industry on the smaller side.  In 
1999, one paper looked at the risk of FBC (small) versus traditional missions.31  It was found that 
FBC missions do have a higher failure rate.  The sample set for this study was small – just ten 
traditional NASA missions and 18 FBC missions.   
The traditional missions investigated have a 10% catastrophic failure rate and a 30% total 
failure rate, which includes partial failures.  FBC missions, on the other hand, have a 28% 
catastrophic failure rate and a 44% total failure rate.  From this sample set of satellites, it appears 
that missions with a quick development schedule and a relatively small total budget are more 
risky than traditional missions.  However, the FBC are cheaper, and the total investment lost is 
shown to be less with FBC failures than with the traditional NASA mission failures. 
This study only looks briefly into the causes of failures.  Figure 7 shows that hardware is the 
mission ending failure 41% of the time in these missions, software 27%, Launch Vehicle (LV) 
9%, Program Management 9%, and Unknown 14%.   
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Figure 7.  “Faster, Better, Cheaper” Satellite Subsystem Failures 
 
2.4.4 Comparison of Failures 
While the numbers of small industry and university satellites in these studies are small, it is 
helpful to compare the results directly to see trends in the data.  This section discussed the total 
number of failures and the subsystem failure percentages for failures that caused the mission to 
end prematurely.  Table 3 shows the overall mission-ending failure rates for satellites is the 
studies presented above for failures after the satellite reaches orbit.  The range is quite large for 
on-orbit failures and does not prove consistent even within similar groups of satellites.  Some 
reasons for this include the different classes and missions of satellites, the intended design lives 
of the satellites, and the way in which failures were investigated and recorded.  The most 
important note is that university run satellites are not an outlier in the range of satellite failures.   
The next two tables show the total number of failures per subsystem (Table 4) and the 
percentage of failures per subsystem (Table 5) for each study.  These results were detailed in the 
previous section and were shown in Figures 3-7.  In the tables, “--” signifies that no information 
was given, whereas “0” means there were zero failures in that subsystem.   Unfortunately, little 
information is available for the university-class and FBC satellites, so it is difficult to directly 
compare them to the other categories. 
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Table 3.  Overall Failure Rate for Satellite Studies 
 
 Study Year and Focus 
Subsystem Thesis 
Study 
2002, 
Geosynch28 
2002, US Military 
and Civil29 
2003, 
GN&C30 
1999,  
FBC31 
Satellite Size University Large Large Civil 
Large 
Military Large Mix 
Overall 
Failure Rate 23% 4.1% 24% 19% 4.6% 
10% - Traditional 
28% - FBC (small) 
Total # 
Satellites  96 1080 186 74 764 28 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Total Number of Satellite Failures Causing Loss of Satellite 
 
 Study Year and Focus 
Subsystem Thesis 
Study 
2002, 
Geosynch28 
2002, US Military 
and Civil29 
2003, 
GN&C30 
1999,  
FBC31 
Satellite Size University Large Large Civil 
Large 
Military Large Mix 
Total # 
Satellites  96 1080 186 74 764 28 
LV 22 38 -- -- -- 1 
Kick Motors -- 9 -- -- -- -- 
Payload -- 3 26 48 7 
GN&C -- -- 21 45 131 
ACS -- 12 -- -- 7 
Power 8 5 19 33 5 
Propulsion -- 6 2 37 4 
Comm 3 3 3 17 2 
C&DH 1 -- 3 4 6 
Thermal 1 0 1 0 -- 
Structures -- 5 0 0 3 
5 
Software -- -- -- -- 1 3 
Operations -- 0 -- -- 1 -- 
Program 
Management 
-- -- -- -- -- 1 
Unknown 7 1 0 0 6 1 
 
                                                 
1
 The 2003 GN&C failure rate estimate includes the failure rate values for ACS, Propulsion, and Software, but the 
latter three are also broken down separately in their rows.   
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Table 5.  Summary of Satellite Failure Rate Percentages for Loss of Satellite 
 
 Study Year and Focus 
Subsystem Thesis 
Study 
2002, 
Geosynch28 
2002, US Military and 
Civil29 
2003, 
GN&C30 
1999, 
FBC31 
Satellite Size University Large Large Civil 
Large 
Military Large Small 
Total # 
Satellites  96 1080 186 74 764 28 
Launch Vehicle 58% 47% -- -- -- 9% 
Kick Motors -- 10% -- -- -- -- 
Payload -- 4% 35% 26% 20% 
GN&C -- -- 28% 24% 37%2 
ACS -- 15% -- -- 23% 
Power 18% 6% 26% 18% 14% 
Propulsion -- 7% 2% 20% 11% 
Communication 8% 4% 4% 10% 6% 
C&DH 3% -- 4% 2% 17% 
Thermal 3% 0% 1% 0% -- 
Structures -- 6% 0% 0% 9% 
41% 
Software -- -- -- -- 3% 27% 
Operations -- 0% -- -- 3% -- 
Program 
Management 
-- -- -- -- -- 9% 
Unknown 18% 1% 0% 0% 17% 14% 
 
It is important to note that there were different classes of satellites in each study.  Different 
types of satellites have different kinds of failures, but comparing them will give a sense of 
whether a trend might exist.  Studies so far have also looked at only a few small industry or small 
university satellites, potentially because this is a newer field with far fewer satellites.  Other 
reasons could include that the information has not been published, or that the satellites are too 
new and have not yet failed.  Nonetheless, there are a few interesting points of discussion.  
 Many of the subsystems have different failure rates across the studies that are hard to 
characterize.  Some reasons for these differentiations might be the diverse types of satellites, the 
source of the data and what was included in its information, or how failures were recorded and 
classified.  Complexity has been noted already to cause failures, and complex hardware can lead 
                                                 
2
 The 2003 GN&C failure rate estimate includes the failure rate values for ACS, Propulsion, and Software, but the 
latter three are also broken down separately in their rows.   
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to more advanced software, which then introduces even more failure modes.  Longer lifetimes 
also require more advanced and complex systems, which can lead to more failures as well.     
While the studies did not provide data to completely fill in these tables, one can get a good 
sense of some basic trends.  Since GN&C, ACS, and Propulsion are very closely related, 
sometimes the papers report GN&C failures but not the rest, or vice versa.  It is a common trend 
that these subsystems cause many of the EOL failures for satellites.   Another difference between 
satellites groups is the propulsion failure rate, which is particularly high for military satellites.  
This high rate is probably due to the fact that military missions often keep using the satellite to 
point to different places until it runs out of fuel, whether it’s exceeded its design life or not. 
There are large differences between studies in the number of Payload, C&DH/Software, and 
Unknown failures.  While not many studies reported on software failure, a large percentage of 
FBC missions failed catastrophically to what they claimed were software issues.  It is a 
possibility that missions with shorter development times don’t have enough time to adequately 
test and debug software.  Software can also be expensive, and FBC missions might not have 
enough money to get systems capable of overcoming faults and working around errors.  As 
mentioned above, complexity is also a cause for more failure modes, so complex software can be 
particularly hard to test and maintain on orbit.   
Launch failures are a concern for every payload, but most notably for university satellites.  
This is partly due to the failure of a Dnepr rocket in 2006, which crashed while carrying 15 
university satellites, which skewed the data for university satellites to be focused on launch 
vehicle failures.12  The Federal Aviation Administration claims that, between 1989 and 2007, 
89% of all launches were successful.32  Aerospace Corporation looked at launches from 1957 to 
1999, and found that of the launches conducted worldwide, 91.1% were successful.33  This 
percentage includes launches early in the space race, many of which failed. 
In summary, power subsystems are unreliable for small, student-run satellites, while large 
satellite programs tend to fail in the subsystems related to Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
(Navigation, ACS, Propulsion, and related software).  However, more information is needed for 
small satellite failures to see if there is a real difference in how these types of satellites fail.  The 
results from these studies may help focus the development process and analysis performed by 
student groups, and projects can apply risk management techniques from either other universities 
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or industry, which are discussed in the next chapter, in order to try to avoid many of these 
technical pitfalls.   
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Chapter 3: Current and Improved Risk Management 
Methods 
This chapter discusses risk management methods at universities across the country to 
demonstrate the wide variety of plans that schools use.  Government risk management practices 
are also briefly analyzed.  Suggestions are then made for improvements to both university risk 
programs and technical failures on small satellites.  Lastly, alternate platforms for satellite 
missions are presented, and their advantages and disadvantages are compared to those of satellite 
programs.   
3.1 Current Risk Management Methods at Universities 
Formal risk management techniques often require a large amount of paperwork.  While 
small programs might consider risk management a good idea, the overhead might be 
overwhelming.  However, all satellite programs are encouraged to use some form of a risk 
management technique. 
Among the universities surveyed, each school seems to use a different risk management 
method.  At many programs, risk assessment is done at a systems level with the team leaders.  
Few formal techniques are used, and teams often just discuss the risks and modes of operation 
and then make design decisions accordingly.  Bringing in outside help, via periodic industry 
reviews, seems to help teams focus their efforts on minimizing risk.   
In a few cases, the risk management process is more developed, and the major risks are 
more formally identified and then traded as design choices.  Projects with more defined risk 
management tend to track their risks and document their decisions better.  In addition, programs 
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with more guidance from an outside source (e.g. the United States Air Force) have a more 
defined and regular risk management plan.  More formal guidance and regular reviews with an 
experienced adviser can lead to a better managed and less risky mission.  The examples below 
describe various ways in which schools do use risk management strategies actively in their 
program. 
3.1.1 The Top Risk List 
An easy technique for teams to implement is the “Top Risk List” or “Stoplight Diagram,” 
where the top risks are identified and managed.  Usually, the risks are associated with a color – 
red, yellow, or green – to display the status of the risk and its mitigation plan.  Green signifies 
that the plan is working as intended, and the risk is reduced.  Yellow means that the plan is not 
working well and may need attention.  Red shows that the plan is not working and that 
management needs to take action to bring the risk under control.   
At the California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo34 (Cal Poly), the top ten 
risks for each subsystem and for the overall project are recorded with the team, and the managers 
of those aspects of the project review the risks each week.  This risk management approach 
requires only a little effort, but it will help keep the entire team thinking about what risks exist 
and how to mitigate them. 
3.1.2 Design-based Risk Decisions 
At the University of Missouri-Rolla35 (UMR), they do not use a sophisticated risk approach, 
but risk management is certainly a part of their design process.  Design decisions are made while 
considering risk as an important factor.  For example, risk is used as a metric in case studies, and 
the team debates risks as they come up.  The students also discuss modes of operation and safe 
modes with the professors on the project as issues arise.  Oftentimes, though, risk management at 
UMR comes down to whether the project can afford a redundant system and if the mass and 
power budgets allow it. 
Queensland University of Technology36 (QUT) approaches design-based discussions and 
decisions through weekly meetings.  At these team meetings, issues and risks are brought up by 
professors and students, and these risks are recorded in the minutes of the meeting.  Often, tasks 
are assigned as action items to someone on the team, and the assignment is left on the agenda 
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until the risk has been taken care of.  This method leaves the risk in the hands of a specified 
owner but also brings the topic up each meeting until the action item is closed.  Both of these 
methods are good ways of getting the team to discuss risk, but they are still ad hoc and do not 
include analysis to show that all risks have been addressed. 
3.1.3 Team Review 
Stanford University37, follows a plan similar to the five step process outlined in 2.1.1.  
Students assess risk by brainstorming the possible failure modes for the part of the satellite for 
which they are responsible.  To control the risks, the faults are categorized as to whether they 
need large, minor, or no changes.  The students also list the ways in which they can eliminate, 
reduce, or live with the risk.  The lists are collected from the team members, and the system 
leads and mentors review them and try to incorporate the mitigation strategies into the design.   
Throughout the project lifecycle, risks are re-reviewed to determine the current level of risk 
and the progress that has been made with the mitigation plans.  To review overall program risks, 
the whole team is involved (including students, faculty, mentors, and former students) so that 
everyone is aware of the risks.  A team review allows every student to be involved in the risk 
management process.  This approach engages students in the awareness of and mitigation of 
risks while keeping the project leaders in charge of the risk management process and decisions. 
3.1.4 Two-Phased Approach 
Cornell University5 has a risk plan that uses two different approaches – one for the 
conceptual and requirements-allocation period and one for the detailed-design phase.  At the 
beginning of the design cycle, while in the conceptual phase, the subsystem functional leads help 
to identify the likelihood and severity of risks.  This assessment decreases risk by identifying 
areas in which money and time should be invested.  Failure modes at the highest level are given 
a risk assessment score, which is the product of the probability of the risk occurring and a 
measure of its consequence.  Next, the leads look at cost-benefit analyses of the mitigation plans 
to find the strategy with the lowest combined risk and cost numbers.   
When the team reaches the detailed-design phase, the major risks have been identified, so 
they use a fault tree analysis to continue to assess risk.  A fault tree shows how initiating events 
can lead to functional failures of a design, such as a spacecraft.38  From this analysis, a system-
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level probability of failure can be calculated to prove that the reliability requirement has been 
met at various phases throughout the mission.  It is only necessary to perform the entire process 
once, and then the fault tree should be updated and monitored as the project progresses.   
A two-phased approach is very useful because it recognizes the need for different risk 
management strategies at various stages in the design, but it is more time-consuming than 
strategies discussed thus far.  At the beginning of a project, the subsystem leads use the identified 
risks to make informed design decisions, and in later phases, the program management can 
monitor and control risks.   
3.1.5 Extensive Testing 
A large number of schools rely on extensive testing to reduce risk in a program.  Since many 
schools use commercial off the shelf (COTS) products, one major concern is the effect of the 
space environment on these components.  In addition, many schools manufacture elements of the 
satellite on their own.  Rather than spending time on computational analysis, many teams build 
components or subsystems and then test them. 
Even though some money will be spent on parts that will be wasted, some schools find it is 
easier and cheaper to do testing rather than spending significant time and money analyzing the 
design.  Cal Poly34 combines risk assessment and testing in their approach.  The Cal Poly team 
looks at failure modes to identify potential points of failure and critical functions and then 
focuses the testing on those areas.  This combination of extensive testing with risk management 
saves critical time and money.  They have also tried to develop logic diagrams, but it is difficult 
to identify all failure modes and their probabilities, even for COTS components.  An additional 
benefit from this procedure is that students have the opportunity to learn both from the 
construction and manufacturing of the system as well as from the testing and analysis performed.  
Another method universities use to reduce risk is to utilize space-proven parts, but this might 
be cost prohibitive.  New Mexico State University39 (NMSU) prefers their students use parts 
with flight heritage or that are “ruggedized” (parts that have wider temperature ranges, can 
withstand greater vibration, etc.).  NMSU also uses the policy of testing components, and they 
intentionally buy spares and learn by testing throughout the design process. 
Both the amount of funding and the level of experience affect hardware acquisition – 
whether the project will choose to make or buy some components.  By fabricating some parts of 
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the satellite, a school can reduce costs while providing hands-on experience to the students.  
However, until a team has sufficient experience with building satellite components, constructing 
elements of the satellite in-house increases risk greatly.  Therefore, the choices about hardware 
acquisition are very situation-dependent, and risk should be an integral part of the decision.   
3.1.6 Industry-guided Program 
Many academic programs use industry professionals for advice on subsystems, program 
reviews, or software and hardware resources.  For the schools, one of the main advantages of 
partnering with industry is to lessen the risk increase caused by the low experience level of 
students.  While professors often lack satellite fabrication experience and are often focused on 
managing the project in addition to providing guidance, industry representatives can be there to 
answer questions while also challenging the design solutions.  For industry, these partnerships 
with schools are advantageous as well because of the exposure in the satellite community and the 
experience with potential workforce candidates trained through the satellite program.   
Industry representatives have varied roles and guidance between programs, but the QUT36 
uses these professionals as leaders in the risk management program.  Industry partners can help 
to train students in risk management while handing over ownership of the risks to the student 
team.  Business personnel are involved in identifying and reviewing risks, and Queensland 
University of Technology uses industry help in brainstorming, workshops, and reviews.  
The fact that students have less experience than industry professionals is important in the 
management of projects at QUT.  To reduce this risk, a safety officer and risk manager are 
assigned to the project from industry.  This person has access to the documentation and talks 
with the cognizant engineers to compile a list of the relevant risks, which are included in a 
master risk log.  To help motivate students for identifying risks, both to teach them and because 
the industry representative is usually a volunteer, the students are brought into this process as 
“risk hunters” and are not blamed for the risks. 
After each major milestone in QUT’s programs, a brainstorming session is held to identify 
all the ways in which the satellite can fail.  To best capture all the risks, the university team 
works with an experienced engineer from industry.  The attendees can use the work breakdown 
structure, operational concept, or subsystem items and then try to identify ways to “break” the 
satellite.  It is important to also study the failure modes of project management and 
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organizational issues in these brainstorming sessions.  Once these sessions have been completed, 
the knowledge must be included in the risk management process by identifying mitigation 
actions and following through with those steps.   
Another approach to include industry help is in risk identification during workshops, which 
are set up to be a more focused discussion of a risk topic.  These sessions have a smaller scope 
and a fewer number of people.  This meeting can be led by an industry representative, but the 
students set the agenda with guidance from the professors and industry representatives.  This 
way, students receive answers to their questions while getting feedback and focus from 
experienced engineers or scientists.   
Industry reviews are one of the most-used tools to get feedback from sources outside a 
university.  The review board may consist of professors from other schools, representatives of 
sponsoring companies or organizations, and un-biased industry personnel.  The main purpose of 
these reviews is to analyze the design of the entire project; risk is only a small subset of the work 
covered.  However, due to the content covered by the reviews, these meetings are often not as 
useful as the previous two methods in terms of identifying and managing risk. 
Many teams schedule reviews at the end of a student’s work term or before a break from 
school, so the faults identified are left for the subsequent team.  This can be a problem if the risk 
items are not documented properly or are not transferred to the next students.  Risk review 
sessions or general review boards should be scheduled during work terms or at the beginning of 
the semester, before class workload increases again.   
Student programs should take advantage of the valuable insight offered by industry 
professionals.  Another useful method to review risk would be to have a smaller industry review 
specifically for risk.  Through the various techniques mentioned, the expertise of professional 
representatives can help guide a program through the risk management process, and they can 
help minimize the risk associated with the fact that students have little technical experience. 
3.1.7 Industry Partner 
Some commercial businesses join together with schools very closely in order to develop 
small satellites.  Most of these groups are small businesses, which allows them to apply for 
funding from NASA.  This section will discuss further the balance in workforce and engineering 
tasks between two such groups.   
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3.1.7.1 Payload Systems Incorporated (PSI) and MIT’s Space Systems Lab (SSL) 
Example 40 
 
PSI and SSL routinely join together for space systems development.  They have developed a 
partnership that covers the complete life cycles of spaceflight experiments, and they include 
students, faculty, research staff, and industry partners.  The combination and balance they have 
achieved allows students to be actively involved in a project while providing large value to the 
customer.  For example, graduate students have written all of the design and control algorithms 
for these projects, which are often used to test advanced and groundbreaking control 
experiments, but PSI does the fabrication and other mechanical work.   
A number of philosophies drive how the relationship between PSI and SSL has developed.  
First, the two teams recognize the fact that some aspects of building and developing satellites or 
their payloads are not well-suited for students due to their education, schedule, or interests.  
Therefore, students at the SSL work on roles fitting them, while professors, staff, and PSI handle 
the other tasks.   
Second, these teams have a “build it wrong, build it right” philosophy, where building it 
wrong the first time is an accepted part of the process.  Students are heavily involved at the 
beginning of a program when there are fewer deadlines and better tasks for students.  As the 
development progresses, more professional staff and contractors get involved to prepare for 
design reviews. 
As the design becomes more detailed, the SSL students work on prototype testing, 
operations plans, mission and data analysis tools, etc.  Prototyping is an ideal area for students 
because they can perform hands-on work without needing a lot of experience.  On the other 
hand, the professional staff and PSI focus on the hardware and software design and fabrication.  
For example, students build the prototype while PSI helps and tweaks that design from the 
beginning.  PSI then works with MIT to make the design better, at which point PSI builds the 
spaceflight experiment.  After the flight experiment is built, students focus on science and 
technical testing of the hardware, mission planning, data analysis, crew training, etc.  PSI 
performs the integration and testing. 
The students are involved throughout the design cycle, but PSI often performs the 
engineering hardware work (such as flight hardware fabrication, integration, and paperwork), 
while MIT focuses on research and analyses relevant to the payload.  This sort of collaboration 
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works well for the SSL, where the graduate students do more in-depth research on the purpose of 
the mission and do not focus on the subsystems and their layouts.   
There are many advantages to partnering with a small company such as PSI, aside from 
potentially gaining Small Business Innovation Research grants.  These companies often have 
many years of experience and advice.  PSI, for example, is familiar with the Shuttle’s and the 
International Space Stations’ safety protocols, making the difficult and long process of Safety 
Assurance relatively easy.   
PSI is only involved when necessary – students do most of the beginning work and then help 
throughout the project.  PSI focuses on meeting fabrication and integration deadlines, 
implementing configuration control procedures, and other tasks not fitting for the academic 
environment.  This plan helps to ensure that the project cost is kept as low as possible while 
maintaining a high-quality spaceflight experiment.   
Third, a partner company can help keep the project on schedule.  Universities can often get 
sidetracked by research, but a development-focused company can help be the project’s schedule-
keeper.  Finally, PSI is located near MIT, and face-to-face meetings and reviews can also 
substantially help keep a project running.   
 
3.1.7.2 Quakefinder and Stanford41 
 
This project was a small business/university collaboration between Stanford, students in a 
Systems Engineering course at Lockheed Martin, and Quakefinder.  This venture came about 
because Stanford wanted to build a small satellite, and Quakefinder had a payload they wanted to 
fly, but no satellite.  In order to get this satellite off the ground, the small business offered 
money, equipment, and personnel, Stanford had students, and Lockheed Martin offered its 
facilities.  The team also decided on a fast schedule – the class worked on the project for nine 
months, and with continued help from the project’s supporters, it was built and tested within 
about 1.5 years.   
In contrast to PSI, the staff at Quakefinder was specialized in different engineering and 
science fields and did not have experience in building spacecraft.  Therefore, many people, even 
on the industry side, were doing tasks for the first time.  A Lockheed Martin review board helped 
the student/industry team to focus their mission, noticing mission creep and high risk items.  This 
review helped them to identify and manage risks. 
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Looking at their high risk items and “Lessons Learned” from other CubeSats, this team 
increased effort in those areas and employed redundancy where it seemed to be needed.  They 
also performed fast, non-traditional testing, such as pointing the spacecraft to an antenna across 
rooftops, in order to ensure basic performance.  This sufficed for their project, but this could 
have been a problem with some designs.  These ad hoc tests did get the job done in this case, but 
they were challenging for risk managers to accept because the tests must demonstrate that it will 
verify the adequacy of the design or production.   
Overall, the Quakefinder project was successful.  The satellite is still working while exposed 
to the sun, and it has been collecting data, so the team’s unconventional yet thoughtful risk 
management and testing plan worked. 
3.1.8 Intense Guidance 
The University of Toronto Institute for Aerospace Studies’ Space Flight Laboratory42 
(UTIAS/SFL) has played a major role in developing, launching, and operating Canada’s first 
microsatellite and space telescope.  This lab also maintains Canada’s only current nanosatellite 
program, which involves both staff and students in the development of satellites under ten 
kilograms for both technology demonstration and small satellite experiments.   
The success of these programs are critical to the nation’s space program, so UTIAS/SFL 
uses a full-time staff of professionals (five to six people) due to the program’s mission reliability 
requirements.  This staff manages the risk issues, creates mitigation strategies, and carries out 
those plans.  To identify risk, systems engineers on the professional staff review the system and 
subsystem level design, and their work is reviewed by the rest of the team.  Their philosophy is 
to ensure that mission critical failure modes are designed out of the satellite so that the system is 
recoverable regardless of software or command errors.  The staff then continues to assess and 
monitor risk throughout the development process.     
Intensely guided programs can be a good risk management learning experience for the 
students, but the students in these projects generally participate only in the discussions – the 
experienced engineers provide the risk analysis.  
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3.1.9 University Nanosatellite Program (UNP)   
The University Nanosatellite Program43 of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is a 
two-year recurring university satellite competition.  Student groups design and build satellites 
that go through a rigorous review process, and one project is chosen to proceed to final 
integration and test at AFRL.  However, many programs continue on if not selected, helping 
students to continue to gain more experience. 
Through partnerships with the Air Force, NASA, the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, and industry representatives, the universities receive funding and guidance from 
their participation in the UNP program.  The Program Office at AFRL provides direction by 
encouraging certain design standards, program requirements, and constraints.  They do not 
specify the type of risk management to be performed, but AFRL personnel also give significant 
management and systems engineering expertise to help with the latter stages of the design cycle 
in order to get the satellite into orbit.  
The UNP process is working – approximately a dozen schools participate in each two year 
program, and the students are getting the larger amount of support that they need.  The ultimate 
goal of getting their spacecraft through the competition and into orbit is an excellent source of 
motivation to make quality design decisions and to adhere to industry-standard best practices.   
The AFRL is also working on their own projects in which they employ fairly relaxed risk 
management methods.  TacSat-3 is a collaborative effort of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, but 
it still is considered a small, cheap, and fast satellite program by government standards.  This 
type of program is ARFL’s step to responsive space.  For this type of program, AFRL uses a 
more “ad hoc” risk management approach because they don’t have the time or resources to 
implement military standard risk management programs.44   
For TacSat, the three systems engineers on the AFRL team created a subjective list of the 14 
top risks of the program.  This method was chosen because it is a bottom-up review process with 
minimum cost and schedule overhead.  They next formulated a plan to periodically measure, 
judge, and mitigate the risks.  Other factors in their plans put an emphasis on forming 
experienced review teams to look at risk as opposed to the costly and time consuming modeling 
and testing done so often in industry.  AFRL is a good example that industry is loosening its risk 
management policies for smaller missions, but the result is to be determined.   
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3.1.10 Tools 
Many schools use simple and widespread programs such as Microsoft Excel to track risk, 
while The Cornell5 teams use Microsoft Project as a server application for risk management.  
These school use a tool that requires very little learning curve.  Logic diagrams and fault trees 
can be created in Microsoft Visio, which is widely available at universities. 
In industry, more complex programs are used to perform failure mode identification.  For 
example, FaultTree+ and RiskSpectrum allow the user to do event tree or fault tree style risk 
assessments.  BlockSim is a simulation code that is used to help do reliability analyses, and the 
DecisionTools suite can be used to perform general work with probabilistic distributions, and 
uncertainty and decision analysis. 
3.2 Risk Management in Industry 
Risk management in industry often goes beyond the five step process outlined in Section 
2.1.1.  All military and government satellites must follow military risk management strategies, 
which are available to the public.  There is little public information about the exact process that 
industry sponsored satellite programs use, but the techniques are most likely very similar.  
Therefore, this section will look into the risk management strategies set forth by the government.   
The risk management, or system safety, procedures are outlined in a military standard (MIL-
STD) document entitled Standard Practice for System Safety.45  There are also other plans that 
apply to system safety and failure mode prevention, including MIL-STD-498 and DOD-STD-
2167A on Software Development and DOD-STD-499B on Engineering Management 
In the System Safety plan, at least one person (if not more) is assigned to be a risk manager, 
who is responsible for everything relating to system safety, which is a highly involved process.  
This one MIL-STD document is 113 pages, and it requires no less than 14 separate forms, with 
multiple kinds of categorizations for mishaps, risks, failures, safety levels, etc.  The MIL-STD-
882E system safety requirements, which also each have multiple action items, consist of the 
following: 
− Documentation of the system safety approach 
− Identification of hazards 
− Assessment of mishap risk 
− Identification of mishap risk mitigation measures 
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− Eliminate hazards or reduce hazard risk through design selection 
− Incorporate safety devices 
− Provide warning devices 
− Develop procedures and training 
− Reduction of mishap risk to an acceptable level 
− Verification of mishap risk reduction 
− Review of hazards and acceptance of mishap risk by the appropriate authority 
− Tracking of hazards, their closures, and mishap risk 
 
It can be inferred that this list of requirements and all the associated work to fulfill the 
requirements would easily overwhelm a student group.  There would be advantages, though, to 
utilizing this complex system on student projects.  First, the MIL-STD method is very 
comprehensive.  Every step is recorded, and there are plans in place to deal with all issues that 
arise.  The process also makes the systems engineers think about every form of risk that may 
occur and how everything is in need of mitigation and monitoring.  Second, there is someone 
always dedicated to the task of system safety, which includes risk management.  Large 
companies often have dedicated resources for system safety, especially for high-value missions.   
On the other hand, there are many disadvantages to applying the MIL-STD process to 
student satellites.  If the entire plan were followed, all the resources available to university 
satellites would be spent on risk management, leaving nothing for the engineering development.  
Since this is obviously a problem, the students could focus in on a subset of the requirements laid 
out by the government process.  Some of the requirements are very important for any project, but 
others may be of limited use to a small satellite program.  It might be time-consuming for a 
student program to pick and choose what’s needed from the MIL-STD list since they have little 
to no experience with these topics.  To identify what students should do for risk management, 
one can notice that there are similarities with the MIL-STD list and the definition of risk 
management detailed in the first section.  It would be best to apply those steps to small satellites 
since they are both manageable for a student group and common in industry.   
While government risk management approaches may help reduce risk, success is not 
guaranteed, and it is impossible to apply their techniques to student programs.  There have also 
not been any public studies on whether these system safety guidelines have been the reason for a 
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reduced number of failures in satellites or if they mitigate certain kinds of risk.  However, 
students should judiciously apply risk management of some form to their projects, and it might 
be best for them to borrow practices and standards from industry or government where 
applicable.   
3.3 Suggestions for Improvement of Programmatic Risks in University Risk 
Management 
Throughout this paper, risk management at universities has been shown to be inconsistent.  
If a university would like to reduce risk and hopefully increase their success rate, the program 
should improve their risk management methods, borrowing from current university, government, 
and industry practices.  Some very basic strategies can be used to reduce overall risk of mission 
failure.  The following practices should be emphasized in a program from the beginning. 
3.3.1 Funding and Competition 
Demonstrating a good grasp on risk management is necessary to get funding and win 
competitions.  Reducing the risk of an overall mission can be accomplished by allowing 
significant risk only in new research areas.  Risk can be minimized elsewhere by using hardware 
with flight-heritage as well as standard algorithms and processes.  Design re-use must be done 
carefully, but it can be valuable for high-level systems as well as at the electronic component 
level.  In cases where the risks are inherent to the mission, the program should maximize the 
satellite’s value for the sponsor by focusing on the needs of the sponsor and designing to meet 
those requirements.   
3.3.2 Experience 
Continuity in student leadership is important in order to keep corporate memory as well as 
push the project forward.  It is necessary to prepare students for these positions.  One way to do 
this would be to have a training/mentoring program.  Other options include having students take 
technical classes, participate in leadership seminars, or attend conferences. 
To reduce the risk associated with a student’s lack of experience, it is necessary to train 
people working directly with the subsystems to identify risk.  Application-based training or 
academic classes are one option, but this might be too difficult to implement in a small program.  
A different option is to create a database of failures that can serve as a reference for students who 
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must identify risk.  By building a template of risk failures, students have a list from which to 
work.  This idea will be discussed further in Section 4.2.   
3.3.3 Staff 
Personnel management is an area in which consistency will lower risk.  One option is to hire 
a core group of people to ensure the most important work is being completed.  By tying the 
staff’s work to a salary, they are obliged to work a set number of hours per week, and there will 
be more consistency in the program. 
Even though staffing can be difficult, student groups should try to not have only one person 
working on each subsystem.  By having every member of the team working on two tasks, there 
will be no single-string workers, and the members of the team have someone to help and 
motivate them.  This may not be feasible if there are too many jobs and not enough students, but 
that might also point to the idea that the task is too complex or the team size needs to be bigger.  
Sharing assignments also helps communication among groups since people are working on more 
than one task.  This distribution of jobs might be difficult to maintain, but it would be beneficial 
for the students and for the team’s communication. 
When working with students, there are times in the semester when workload is lower, and 
more time and energy can be devoted to extra-curricular activities such as satellite programs.  
During these times, the projects should focus on critical items such as risk mitigation.  After 
student breaks and at the start of a semester are ideal times to review risk and ensure that 
students are staying focused on risk management. 
3.3.4 Direction 
The professors and students must work with all of the groups that oversee the project to 
define the mission and its requirements from the start of the program.  It is then necessary to 
keep track of requirements, their sources, and the rationale behind them as well as flow them 
down to the rest of the system.   
To maintain the proper focus, the mission and its requirements must be clearly defined, and 
the students must have oversight of their work.  Setting mission goals and strict requirements 
helps students to take the project seriously, and project goals and supervision help students make 
progress in the correct direction. 
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3.3.5 Schedule 
Falling behind schedule at any point in the design life can be a huge barrier to meeting a 
launch date.  This is because not being on schedule will drive up costs and encourage risk taking 
in order to meet a (most likely inflexible) launch date.  From the start, everyone must take the 
mentality that they are on a flight program, and deadlines must be met, but not by dropping risk 
management.  The team should build a reasonable schedule, with margin, and one way is to step 
backwards from the launch date using key milestones (driven by integration), and stick to the 
review schedule that is set by the launch date.  This extremely important job should be the job of 
someone with experience and that can enforce the limits on the team.   
The strict deadlines imposed by an immovable launch date can lead to poor and hasty fixes 
of a student-satellite design.  One solution to this problem is to implement a tiered design.  By 
using spiral requirements, the team can do multiple releases of the satellite based on the tiered 
requirements, but every release can fly.  This approach can be done for each subsystem or for the 
system as a whole.  However, this staged release approach can be a hard method to implement 
for teams with little experience and low funding. 
NASA Langley Research Center suggests that small satellite programs should focus on risks 
preventing the completion of a milestone.  Instead of focusing on the risks that threaten 
individual technological advancements, the team should examine what the risks are that must be 
overcome to reach program milestone completions. The resources can be reallocated to better 
ensure that the next objective is reached.46  
Oftentimes, the staff of a project can get discouraged or pessimistic about a project, leading 
to its delay and eventual cancellation.  The Quakefinder41 group tried not to let that happen to 
them, and they have the following suggestions.  A project must be approached with the mindset 
that the team will succeed, and even if there isn’t enough time, the team must be creative in its 
solutions.  A solution that is “good enough” is often the way to proceed, as Quakefinder 
demonstrated.  In addition, creating infrastructure in a class or program for multi-year programs 
would be beneficial to avoid “reinventing the wheel” and slowing progress.   
3.3.6 Documentation 
Throughout the aerospace industry, its professionals are not good about passing on 
information to future generations.  This will be a large problem as a large portion of the 
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workforce nears retirement, and the same issue plagues student satellite projects because of their 
high turnover rates.  Retaining students as they transition from undergraduate to graduate school 
is a great advantage for a satellite program.  Many schools encourage students to stay for their 
graduate work, but this cannot be guaranteed.   
Therefore, it is imperative that the universities have a good method for transferring 
information from one year to the next as students graduate or otherwise leave the program.  A 
consistent and enforced policy should be created in order to pass along the important issues in 
designing, integrating, testing, risk management, and operating space missions.  This knowledge 
transfer can be better controlled using consistent documentation and knowledge-management 
tools throughout the program. 
Consistent application of well-defined procedures, guidelines, and documentation can help 
to minimize careless errors while maintaining knowledge transfer.  The management of the 
program should also stress that documentation is a necessary aspect of the engineering design 
process.  An online documentation system can be used to keep documents in a central location 
with version and access control.  
Concept tracking and keeping up-to-date information is aided by a configuration 
management process.  Configuration management, in which revision control, change control, and 
release control are regulated, can address many common problems before they escalate.  Many 
schools do not use a system to control their documents, but without this method, students will not 
know what information is current, how and when decisions were made, or what aspects of the 
design have been set.  It would be best to have the system run by students but be based on a 
proven system, using guidelines from industry.  This is one example of taking standard practices 
and adapting them to student situations.  These processes reduce risk by helping to document 
work, communicate changes, and maintain consistency as the staff varies.   
Another way to minimize the effects of turnover is to break work into smaller tasks that can 
be completed in a semester or two.  Then, the student can write a final report on that specific 
section of the work before he or she leaves the program.   
Programs that are similar at a large number of schools (e.g. CubeSat) have a unique ability 
to reduce risk.  The teams should share information on lessons learned, probabilities of failure, 
high risk areas, etc.  Many people may have thoughts on their own failures or suggestions for 
other schools, but they have not translated these into a resource for other programs to use, or if 
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they have, they have not publicly shared them.  By distributing this information, schools are less 
likely to make the same mistake, saving time, money, and frustration and reducing risk.  An 
infrastructure, which could be hosted on a common website, is needed for universities to actively 
carry out this plan.   
3.3.7 Recruitment 
Student-led programs should continually train and recruit new members, especially younger 
undergraduates that have the potential to be involved for many years.  It is possible to recruit 
older students by offering credit or research for their senior theses or independent studies, but 
only some schools have those options.   
Since university teams have difficulty getting a full team of experienced students, these 
teams should aim to have a three-tiered student structure.6  First, it is necessary to have student 
experts with knowledge of all aspects of the design.  Second, people with corporate memory are 
valuable to a program to help discuss design decisions and rationale.  Third, a large group of 
semi-knowledgeable students can help with design tasks and when a large staff is needed.  
Recruiting and maintaining this type of team will help keep the project balanced and headed in 
the right path.   
3.4 Mitigation of Technical Risks 
While this paper focuses more on the identification of risks and not necessarily their 
mitigation, understanding the mitigations of risks helps one to identify possible failure 
mechanisms.  Therefore, in this section, some mitigation strategies for technical risks will be 
presented.  This discussion will not be comprehensive of all types of technical failures, but it will 
cover mitigation strategies for most of the technical failures that have been discussed thus far.  
For more information on technical risk mitigation, see the sources outlined in Table 1 as well as 
other published papers on lessons learned. 
3.4.1 General 
Presented in this section are overall design considerations that can reduce the technical risk 
of a mission.  Later, risk reductions for systems engineering, launch, and specific subsystems 
will be discussed. 
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Payload failure is seen as a large cause of a mission ending early (Table 5).  It should be 
obvious that well-tested payloads are necessary for mission success.  In most cases, a satellite 
can still function without its payload, but the point of the mission is lost.  For university 
satellites, which are sometimes more technology demonstrations rather than science missions, 
payload failure is slightly less important.  However, more schools are launching scientific 
payloads, so a reliable payload design is needed. 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) parts can greatly reduce the technical risks in a program.  
Having experience with a component can be invaluable.  By using COTS parts, missions can 
usually achieve higher performance and reliability with lower cost, as well as potentially less 
mass, power, and volume, all of which are important to spacecraft design.  COTS parts were 
shown to be reliable in the areas of structures, thermal systems, batteries, and electronics.3  
Universities should use this heritage to decrease technical risk in their programs.  These types of 
components are more readily available and can be more reliable, at least in the environment for 
which they were designed.  Therefore, it is necessary for someone who understands how the 
space environment affects components to evaluate whether the COTS part is a good match for 
the satellite.   
Hardware failure is a large issue for any project.  Redundancy is often considered as a means 
to reduce risk, especially to design out single point failures, but one must first pick the correct 
form of redundancy (if any at all) for their needs.  The types of redundancy include the 
following: same design redundancy, k-out-of-n redundancy, diverse design redundancy, 
functional redundancy, and temporal redundancy.47 
Same design redundancy involves installing two identical components with a switch to make 
one active.  K-out-of-n redundancy, where a pool of spares can be assigned to replace any one of 
the active units, is similar to same design redundancy, but it’s sometimes cheaper when used for 
components such as data storage, multi-cell batteries, solar panels, etc.  In diverse design 
redundancy, two or more components that have different designs are used to provide the same 
service.  This gives high protection against random and design failures.  Functional redundancy 
(sometimes called analytic redundancy) is when one component can serve a different purpose 
from its intent.  The backup components may result in reduced performance, but it avoids 
increasing cost and mass of the other types of redundancies, and there is also protection against 
some random and design failure.  Finally, temporal redundancy is the repetition of an 
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unsuccessful operation.  In addition, one can also change the software or the operations to 
accommodate an unplanned-for event or failure.   
Redundancy increases the complexity of the spacecraft and is not always desirable for 
student spacecraft, which aim to be simple and are highly constrained on volume and mass.  To 
increase the likelihood of success, resources can be focused on increasing component reliability 
instead of incorporating backup systems.  Teams must remember that redundant systems can add 
mass, consume power, require more support hardware and software, and cost more.  Therefore, 
designers should evaluate these factors when considering the options for redundancy in their 
systems.  
To reduce the risk of using an unproven technology, new components can be used alongside 
space-proven parts.  This diverse design redundancy includes new space hardware or software, 
but it is relatively safe for the mission, if done correctly, and it is an excellent method to achieve 
technology insertion.  This practice has been performed for years at Surrey Satellite Technology 
Ltd48 (SSTL) and works well for their business.  Universities could also capitalize on this idea 
and aim to get funding specifically for testing new technologies in a non-threatening manner.  
Whether the satellite has redundant components or not, it may prove valuable to buy backup 
systems of long lead or risky items in advance.  Therefore, the program should be structured 
around component for which the project can get backups and not utilize unique components.  As 
for the expense of backups, Mark Maier of the Aerospace Corporation states “If you can't afford 
three of something, you can't afford one of them.” 24  In other words, the team should not buy 
parts if they can’t afford buying three of the same component. 
Robust design can also prove to be a valuable risk mitigation method.  If the mission allows, 
over-designing subsystems can save the mission from failure.  For example, SSTL’s three axis 
spacecraft often carry solar panels on all sides – not just the side facing the sun.48  This kind of 
robust design allows for the mission to continue in, and hopefully recover from, some off-
nominal situations. 
If the university is planning on doing multiple missions, it may make sense to follow 
SSTL’s48 practice of creating modular microsatellites.  Their satellites in this class range from 
ten to 100 kilograms, and their platforms are driven by the desire to have modular and flexible 
designs.  These standard satellite platforms can be used for multiple missions.  This method 
keeps cost low by re-using designs that are appropriate for different missions and that have 
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proven past performance.  This practice should also reduce the amount of documentation, 
analysis, qualification, etc. needed for each satellite.  Modularity can also make replacing old 
parts easier, and assembly and testing will be quicker. 
3.4.2 Systems Engineering 
Many satellite failures come from inadequate or incomplete systems engineering.  This type 
of oversight can come either as a lack of systems supervision in the design process or a lack of 
systems testing.  It is necessary for projects to have a competent and trained systems engineer in 
order to ensure that the entire spacecraft will function as a whole and to ensure that adequate 
testing is performed. 
 
3.4.2.1 Systems Engineering Supervision 
Swartout3 suggests using small spacecraft with fewer parts as well as common interfaces, 
especially between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft, to reduce risk.  Other program- and 
systems-level risk reduction strategies can include short mission duration, large operational 
margins, and thorough functional and environmental testing.  
Managing and monitoring the design from a systems-engineering perspective will also help 
reduce technical risks.  Flowing down requirements and ensuring verification of each 
requirement will help to ensure that the mission goals are met.  Trade studies can also be 
performed while considering risk.  This method is useful to look at the cost-benefit analysis of 
certain designs given their risk levels.  In addition, trade studies can help determine what types of 
mitigation solutions should be utilized. 
A good systems engineer should help focus attention on risks that affect the entire system, 
such as designing all subsystems to withstand the space environment to a specified level, 
preventing contamination, quality control, etc.  Another important aspect of systems engineering 
is making sure that changes or repairs do not propagate negatively into the system.  Management 
techniques such as configuration control help prevent this problem, but a competent systems 
engineer must be part of the team that evaluates changes that may affect the whole system. 
A de-scope plan can be used in conjunction with a risk management program to lower risk.  
De-scope options are technical areas of the satellite that be changed to reduce cost, mass, power, 
etc.  Even though de-scope options reduce performance of the mission, it is important to identify 
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elements that can be de-scoped while still maintaining the baseline mission.  A large area of 
programmatic risk is the underestimation of schedule or money, and having viable de-scope 
options can help keep the satellite within its allocations. 
 
3.4.2.2 Systems Testing 
Testing components on the ground is critical in any satellite engineering project.  There are a 
few suggestions that may help catch more problems in the testing phases.  First, subsystem 
vacuum and thermal testing will help to identify areas of the design that need improvement or 
rework early on.  Second, care must be taken to model the space environment well so that the 
design margin will be insufficient.   
Third, the team should test components based on observed anomalies from other, preferably 
similar, flights.  While integrated testing of the satellite is necessary and useful, testing 
components that have a higher likelihood of failure is also valuable.  For example, pyrotechnics 
and high-velocity propulsion have shown to cause many in-flight catastrophic failures.22, 28  By 
testing these components on the ground, if possible, the project may be able to reduce the risk of 
early mission failure.  Focusing testing on components that have a high likelihood of failure 
could prove less costly and more advantageous to the project than testing the entire system early 
on in the design life. 
Finally, a functional prototype (a replica of the flight hardware used to test the design) has 
been suggested by many as necessary to perform ground testing prior to finalizing the design.  If 
the flight hardware is not too expensive, then testing before the design has been completed can 
help identify many errors that would have come up in the pre-launch testing, which is sometimes 
too late to fix the problems before launch.  Of course, all of these activities must be done early 
enough in the design cycle to ensure that enough time exists to fix issues that arise. 
3.4.3 Launch 
Even though catastrophic launch failure is outside the team’s area of responsibility, it can be 
unavoidable, and the students should minimize launch risks by choosing a launch provider 
wisely.  The appropriate launch vehicle for a project will be a balance of risk, capability, and 
cost.  In addition, two of the studies presented in Section 2.4 have failures that stem from 
satellite-launch vehicle interface failure.3,22  However, risks associated with the satellite-launcher 
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interface can be mitigated partially by the satellite team.  As with any interface, close attention 
must be paid to requirements for mass and power as well as the reliability of mechanical and 
electrical connections, including release mechanisms.   
One option to get to a space on a launch vehicle or the Space Shuttle is through the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Space Test Program.  The Space Experiments Review Board 
annually compares and then ranks the proposed experiments and satellites based on their military 
relevance, and they then try to find a launch opportunity for those payloads.  The Space Test 
Program provides even more for its chosen payloads, such as launch integration (including 
multiple payloads on a multi-payload bus), representation in meetings with the launch vehicle 
providers, communicating with the launch ranges, etc.  This program eases the difficulty of 
finding a launch vehicle and working with launch vehicle integration, provided that the mission 
is relevant to the DoD.49   
3.4.4 Structures 
While structures fail less than other subsystems, complex structures with less heritage and 
more moving parts (such as inflatable structures, deployable booms, etc.), are probably more 
likely to fail than traditional structures.  Components such as telescoping parts, deployable 
panels, weak springs, tethers, etc. can more easily malfunction and cause the satellite to fail.  
Attention should be paid to careful design and testing of structural mechanisms to avoid failures 
from complex systems. 
Mechanical systems are also usually places for single-string failures because redundancy is 
hard to design into the system.  Testing mechanical systems can also be difficult because many 
components in the structures subsystem are single-use, making testing of the flight components 
difficult.  The space environment, with different loading, vibration, radiation, etc., can also be 
hard to simulate for student satellite with limited testing budgets.  Finally, with long lead times to 
launch as well as launch delays, mechanical systems can lose lubricant or can otherwise corrode, 
so the team must take those delays into account when designing the system and planning 
operations.  
Testing designed for sensitive mechanical structures and batch testing (testing one-use 
components from the same production line to determine reliability) could help decrease the risk 
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associated with the structural subsystem.  In addition, pre-launch testing of devices with 
lubricant, if possible, would ascertain whether the vehicle is ready to fly. 
3.4.5 Power 
While every subsystem is important in the spacecraft, the power subsystem is extremely 
critical to achieving full design life, and this subsystem has been shown to commonly fail in 
university satellites.  While further study must be performed to better understand power failures, 
it was discussed in Section 2.4 that battery charging and high-density power sources fail more 
than other parts of the power satellite subsystem.  With the complex systems required for energy 
collection and high degradation of solar panels from extreme environments of space, solar panels 
should be designed and thoroughly tested for the mission.22  In addition, since there are so many 
power system failures on orbit for small satellites, schools must make an effort to better test 
these systems before orbit.  Testing practices may help identify failures that would cause failure 
on orbit, allowing teams to fix the problems prior to launch and proceed with the mission.  For 
example, during pre-launch testing, it was discovered that the Quakefinder satellite had one solar 
panel not working.  They could design enough margin into the rest of the system, though, to be 
able to fly with a broken panel and not delay the mission. 41   
Perhaps with limited budgets power testing is difficult to perform, but other means of 
verification may be possible.  For example, better modeling and analysis may be a way to reduce 
failures on orbit.  Or, demonstration of the working system under a few extreme conditions may 
be helpful to locate any inter-subsystem problems.  Other difficulties in testing may be due to the 
power systems complexity and its reliance on other subsystems, which may be hard to model.   
3.4.6 Software 
Robust software can prevent many anomalies from causing critical failures.  It is possible 
that some mechanical or design failures could potentially be fixed by software control, so 
software should be designed to eliminate or overcome all failure modes.  Software can be a very 
expensive and time-consuming part of the mission in order to be well-designed and tested.  
Despite the resources needed to develop robust software, it is important to rigorously manage 
and test software and all its components, starting early in the design life. 
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3.4.7 Thermal 
Most likely due to a good understanding of the space thermal environment and extensive 
thermal testing prior to launch, thermal failures were not high on the list of mission-ending 
failures (Table 5).  However, the thermal subsystem must make sure that components are in their 
operating temperature; otherwise, an off-nominal thermal condition may lead to another 
subsystem’s failure.  Thermal cycling can also be an issue for components in the spacecraft.  For 
example, one mission did not realize that flexible solar arrays are susceptible to thermally 
induced vibrations.22  This kind of thermal error can lead to solar array degradation because of 
the thermal cycling, or it can lead to total power (or structural) failure if the vibrations get too 
large.  This example demonstrates the need for comprehensive thermal testing prior to launch.    
3.4.8 GN&C 
The Guidance, Navigation, and Control subsystem is shown to be a large cause of EOL 
failures across satellite groups (Table 5).  Remember, GN&C also includes subsystems that are 
directly involved in GN&C activities, including ACS, Propulsion, software, and ground 
operations. 
The main area for improvement in GN&C is the hardware.  While not in the scope of 
student missions, gyroscopes and reaction wheels with longer intended design lives must be 
developed to help mitigate risk.  Universities, though, should make an effort to utilize hardware 
with heritage and ample expected design life if these components are mission critical.  Other 
hardware, including pyrovalves, thrusters, processors, receivers, etc. also cause mission ending 
failures, and therefore, need to be carefully chosen or designed and tested.   
3.4.9 Radiation 
Radiation can affect any spacecraft in orbit, but how radiation affects the electronics 
onboard depends on the type of radiation event encountered, which includes single-event upsets 
and single-event latchups.  Single-event upsets, or bit-flips, are the most common radiation-
caused events, and they can be fixed with error detection and correction software that locates and 
reverses the event.  Single-event latchups are of more concern, causing the part to draw 
excessive power and to no longer operate until the power is shut off and then turned back on 
again.  While resetting the circuit by cycling the power often works, a single-event latchup can 
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destroy the component or other power-sensitive electronics if the power supply cannot handle the 
current, and they are an annoyance to the team because they disrupt the mission.  The last type is 
a single-event burnout, but these are not recoverable.50  
3.5 Alternatives to Satellite Platforms 
While satellite projects can be engaging and inspiring, they are also very expensive for a 
project that has a primary objective of teaching engineering to students.  Other engineering 
projects exist that will provide similar experience to students, but they can cost substantially less.  
These projects have similar risks and failure modes and, therefore, can be an excellent learning 
experience for students.  They are also a good method to both train students on engineering and 
risk management aspects and to put an infrastructure in place before working on a satellite 
project.  Platforms such as high-altitude balloons, sounding rockets, CanSats (satellite-like 
payloads that fit in a soda can but do not reach space), or piggyback space experiments are good 
alternatives to building and launching a satellite. 
Satellite programs are useful for collecting certain kinds of information and for long-
duration missions, but the non-satellite platforms have other advantages.  Balloons can obtain 
unique types of data from the same location for multiple days, and the other platforms can collect 
different types of data and perform tests on new technologies.  Students may also be able to do 
more hands-on work with the hardware and try new and unproven instruments in a cheaper 
manner. 
In addition, these different platforms have fewer programmatic risks – they can have lower 
cost, less-stringent schedules, less technical risk, more relaxed interface requirements, fewer 
managerial tasks, and a good match of project length to the time a student can spend on the 
project.51  However, in many people’s eyes, they are less prestigious than satellite missions.  
Of high concern to all projects is cost.  For comparison throughout the next sections, the cost 
of student-run satellites must first be discussed.  University satellites cost tens of thousands to 
millions of dollars, but most are in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars.  Cal Poly estimates 
that a CubeSat (a 10 cm cube with a mass of up to 1 kg) of “medium-sophistication” costs 
around $100,000-$125,000, including launch (which is about $40,000, currently).  Schools have 
produced CubeSats for less but with much cheaper and lower quality components, while other 
schools have produced satellites for much more.52  The next sections will investigate the 
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alternatives to satellite platforms, how they perform risk management, their cost, and their failure 
rate, where the information is available.   
3.5.1 Balloons 
Balloon projects tend to involve more professor participation while utilizing both 
engineering and science students.  The main focus of these programs is to collect research quality 
measurements for further study by the professors and graduate students.  Most schools develop 
just the payload with a commercially-supplied balloon, but others work more on the engineering 
design of the whole system.  Many programs do show, though, that they are able to combine the 
goals of engineering and science students to create a challenging and relevant project.   
Just as in satellite projects, there are a variety of ways in which programs handle their 
management process, but all of the schools reviewed do perform risk management, exposing 
their students to this important practice.  At the University of Washington51, the managerial 
aspect is under the control of the faculty and classroom teaching assistants.  Students focus on 
the development of their instrument, but the systems engineering (including risk management), 
logistics, program management, etc. are handled by the professors working with the project.  
University of Washington has noted that balloon missions are better than satellites to test 
potential failures because components and test flights can be less expensive. 
On the other hand, a joint project between the University of Hawai’i53 and the University of 
New Hampshire has an extensive risk management program that involves their students.  The 
balloon mission is broken up into multiple sectors, and the people working on that section 
identify the potential risks.  Then, the team comes together to discuss each risk.  This process is 
started from the beginning and continued throughout the design with constant communication 
between sectors to ensure risks are dealt with.  However, it should be noted that this project has 
nearly one-to-one professor to student ratio as well as employees from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  This high ratio may help to have a more defined risk 
program.   
One balloon project that is run similar to satellite projects is at Iowa State University54 in the 
Spacecraft Systems and Operations Lab.  Their project team adheres to written procedures 
similar to what other high-altitude balloons and NASA use throughout the lifecycle of the 
project, which is in the form of a checklist.  They also focus on risk at a series of reviews.  To 
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prepare the checklist, the students do a fault-tree diagram of the project to show where the risks 
could be.  Their students are also working on a method to track risks once they’ve been 
identified.   
Oftentimes, there is a large difference between the intent of a satellite project and the intent 
of a balloon project.  Balloon missions, and their students, are more focused on the science than 
on the engineering, and the platform is just a means to get to the science.  Sometimes, the 
students learn little about the engineering design process because they are involved in the science 
aspects of the mission, but it depends on the project and its purpose.  A good balance would be to 
put a team of engineers and scientists together so that both sets of students could take away 
valuable lessons. 
Balloon programs span a wide range of costs, from very affordable to more expensive than 
CubeSats, but they might not necessarily be “cheap.”  According to The University of 
Washington51, a grant for the development of a single instrument over three years is typically 
around $200,000, and a whole balloon project will be around $500,000.  These grants support 
everything needed for the project, including one to two graduate students, materials, professors, 
launch, and operations.  Balloon handling is sometimes leveraged from launching services for 
large projects, and for smaller projects that can be hand-launched, the team handles the logistics 
or has to pay around $100,000 for industry support. 
On the other hand, Iowa State University54 runs smaller projects (1200-3000 gram balloons) 
for around $400-$900 per flight for the balloon, helium, vehicles, and miscellaneous hardware.  
For operations, the students and professors are paid, which brings the cost up to about $1000-
$1500 per flight.  The research and development costs are separate, but they vary depending on 
the mission and can’t be generally categorized.   
Failure rates can be difficult to classify in the same way as was done for student satellites.  
On balloon projects, students have extensive guidance from professors and are therefore usually 
not responsible for the whole design.  Nonetheless, there have been cases of student-led 
hardware failing in flight.  In one instance, a student’s system to rotate the balloon payload failed 
in one flight out of five.51  In another, a component failed in one flight, was modified, and 
worked in the next.51  
At Iowa State54, the failure rate has been low – about 5% of over 90 flights thus far, 
including about 70% student-designed electronics.  This low failure rate may be due to their 
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strict observance to standard industry procedures as well as their focus on everyone’s 
involvement in the risk management process.  There have only been two major failures (neither 
in the electronics) for the graduate research group.  In addition, there have been four failures for 
cutdown of the payload, but these have not been attributed to a specific source.  On the other 
hand, the senior design class had a 60% failure rate, but they were much less experienced at the 
tasks assigned.  In general, this university shows that students can be involved in many balloon 
flights in a cost-effective and reliable manner.   
Industry-supplied balloons and support are not failure-free either, and these can contribute to 
mission degradation or mission failure.  Some failures include premature payload cutdown, the 
balloon not reaching the correct altitude, balloon power system failure, telemetry ground station 
failure, and temperature-induced failure of the communication system.51  
With this limited data on balloon missions, it is hard to compare their “worth” to satellite 
projects.  However, with launches and test flights easier to perform on balloon experiments, it is 
possible to turn failed hardware around and get another flight sooner.  This, of course, is not free, 
but since the payload is often returned to the team, a re-flight for a balloon payload can be more 
cost effective than building and flying a whole new satellite.  In addition, this returned hardware 
can provide an opportunity for corroboration of failure analysis with the flight hardware, which 
is something most satellite missions can not do.  Failures are still costly enough to teams, though, 
that they are a good incentive for focusing on mission success.  
3.5.2 Sounding Rockets 
In the same manner as balloon experiments, sounding rockets have many advantages over 
satellite missions.  Sounding rockets provide a way in which payloads can get to high, suborbital 
altitudes to run experiments or test new technologies for a moderate cost.  Experiments can be 
run for space, microgravity, or Earth science research, and the payloads return to Earth, landing 
with a parachute system.  The capability to return the payload to the owner can further reduce 
cost by being able to reuse the payload or some of its components.   
Students in their undergraduate or high school career can participate in the Student Launch 
Program or the NASA Student Involvement Program, which gets students involved in the full 
research process.  Sounding rockets can provide a great research opportunity, especially for 
graduate students, who can focus attention on the p
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the sounding rocket.  In addition, sounding rocket launches are easier to obtain than launch 
vehicles, which can be useful for scheduling for student groups.  Sounding rockets are also a 
lower risk investment because they are less expensive and have more heritage than university 
satellites.  As with balloons, they also have faster turnaround time and provide good information 
on failure modes if they payload is returned to the university.   
No information was available on the risk management practices or of failure rates for 
schools using sounding rockets.  Further investigation in this area is necessary.    
3.5.3 CanSats 
The Annual CanSat Competition55 is open to university and high school students across the 
United States, Mexico, and Canada.  The students are involved in the project over the entire life 
cycle, giving them hands-on learning from design to integration and test to satellite operations.  
While these CanSats do not reach orbit, they do provide a platform for designing, building, and 
launching space projects and are an excellent way for a university to get started in the satellite 
business. 
CanSats are by far the cheapest platform – schools have a limit of $1000 that they are 
allowed to spend on the materials for the satellite and other outside services to enter the CanSat 
competition.  The rockets were provided by the competition organizers.  More investigation is 
needed as to why, but the CanSats have a high failure rate.  The first year, all three entries failed.  
The next year, four out of the seven that launched failed.  This year, 19 of the 27 teams are still 
left after the preliminary design review, but the launch will occur later this year.55  Despite high 
failure rates, this program is a great way to get schools into satellite design in an extremely low-
cost manner.   
Risk management has not been an important focus for the teams doing CanSat project.  It 
would be possible to reduce risk by implementing a simple risk management plan based on the 
options presented thus far.  These projects do not need a very formal program, but some risk 
management could help their success rates and help students understand the risk management 
process.   
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3.5.4 Piggyback Experiments 
Piggyback space experiments are small payloads that can fly out to operational orbits on a 
host satellite or be attached to a rocket upper stage, but they do not have to be jettisoned from the 
host carrier.  These experiments could also fly inside the Space Shuttle or International Space 
Station.  The SPHERES56 (Synchronized Position Hold Engage and Reorient Experimental 
Satellites) project at MIT is a current example of this type of experiment because it only operates 
in the International Space Station.  One of its goals is to reduce risk of the emerging technology 
of autonomous formation flight.  Instead of applying a high degree of risk to multi-million dollar 
missions, SPHERES serves as an intermediate vehicle on which they can develop and test 
algorithms.  
SPHERES is a highly involved and complex project, so the program has been expensive by 
small satellite standards.  However, the project has kept cost and risk down by being a piggyback 
experiment and by designing satellites with user control.  The cost expenditure for development, 
launch, and operations, over about a four year period, was approximately $2.5 million.57  Other 
schools can use the piggyback method for lower cost given a less complex mission. 
Despite the cost and the complexity of the mission, SPHERES does not discuss risk in a 
formalized manner.  Failure modes are brought up and discussed when students encounter these 
issues, and most often fixes are made in the software.  Hardware and software testing are 
performed both before launch as well as at the beginning of each test session on the Station.  
This method has proven to work for their project; only one problem was found after launch, and 
it was fixed with a software upload.   
3.6   Advantages of Student-Run Satellite Programs 
While alternate platforms are a good method to get students involved in hands-on space 
missions, there are numerous advantages to designing and building satellites through university 
programs.  Students gain experience and are motivated by satellite engineering and from working 
with industry, and the schools benefit too from publicity and research funding.   
While experience on other platforms is useful, it is not quite the same as working with a true 
satellite mission.  Students are exposed to hardware, software, quality assurance, testing 
specified to the space environment, systems engineering, and much more.  Not all of these tasks 
are present on missions based on other platforms.  In a satellite project, students can work on 
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detail-oriented technical work, systems engineering for subsystems, systems engineering for the 
whole project, program management, or some combination of all these tasks.  This is very 
valuable experience that students are not likely to get otherwise.  Therefore, to get the best 
understanding and to prepare the students as well as possible for a career in aerospace 
engineering, small satellites are the best option.   
With student satellites, there are usually a smaller number of people working on the project 
(as compared to an industry program), so changes can be implemented quickly.  These small 
groups also lead to shorter lines of communication, both formally and informally.  Because of 
this, students learn a lot about the design decisions and processes of the other subsystems within 
the satellite, increasing their understanding of the system as a whole.   
Satellite projects allow students to relate their education to a real hands-on satellite project, 
which can be an inspiration to students.  Professors have another opportunity to teach satellite 
engineering in a manner that will relate to the student’s interest – getting their satellite to space.  
The students are more motivated to learn the material while participating on a satellite that is 
really going to fly.  Students are more likely participate and help the project succeed if they are 
working on an exciting mission. 
Students are also able to work with companies specific to the many fields included in 
aerospace engineering.  This way, students are able to learn more about real world engineering, 
both for technical and career-related reasons, since employers want to select new graduates with 
relevant work experience.  Companies also like the ability to work with students, one reason for 
which is to gain prospects for future employees.   
Satellite projects are also advantageous for the university.  Satellite programs carry prestige, 
and schools can use their involvement in satellite design to increase the school’s visibility.  
Universities will bring in more research money to the school with a satellite program, also 
bettering its reputation.  Schools are flying more advanced payloads, so that they are working 
with payload providers and getting data back that can be used in publications and further studies, 
which benefits both the universities and the students.  It is also possible that the school could find 
a niche in small satellite development and provide a service to the community, hence bringing in 
more money to the program.  One example of this is at Cal Poly, where they provide a 
deployment mechanism, integration, acceptance testing, and shipment to the launch vehicle for 
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CubeSats.  Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd also started as a lab of University of Surrey and 
spun-off as a separate business.   
Companies looking to do space research may soon want to work with universities.  Student 
satellite projects are usually cheaper but more risky than their industry counterparts.  As 
universities get more experience and put good management practices in place, student-run, small 
satellites will be an even more appealing option.   
Whatever the platform, working with students has its advantages because of their 
determination, passion, and optimism.  Students can also be more creative as well as more open 
to hearing new ideas and innovative solutions to problems.  In the future, hopefully more 
businesses will be interested in partnering with students to create inexpensive and novel space 
missions.       
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Chapter 4: Failure Mode Analysis Options and the 
Master Logic Diagram (MLD)  
Chapter 4 begins with a comparison of failure mode analysis options.  The master logic 
diagram (MLD) will then be studied in depth to show how a general MLD can be developed to 
apply to any student-run small satellite program.  Uses, restrictions, and benefits of the MLD are 
all discussed in detail. 
4.1 Failure Mode Analysis Options 
Small satellite programs that are run by students require guidance that ad hoc risk 
management approaches cannot provide.  It is necessary to have a tool more applicable to these 
programs, which can help guide the users to identify failure modes.  It would be most beneficial 
to have a way to better identify technical risks, but the program must also keep in mind that 
programmatic risks can cause technical failures as well because of the management, 
configuration control, lack of oversight, etc.  To recognize technical risks, one method that might 
be suitable for a student team is a framework for risk identification that the students can then 
modify to suit their needs.   
The method chosen for the framework should meet a number of guidelines in order to be 
most fitting for student use.  First, the option should be one of the common ways that engineers 
in industry analyze failure modes.  By using a tool that is common in the engineering world, 
students will be able to get experience that will be valuable to them in their jobs.  In addition, 
students have more places to seek help if they are analyzing risk with a tool that the industry can 
help support.   
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Second, the method that students use should be easy to learn and consume as little time as 
possible to implement.  It should also be a technique that can be generalized for small satellites 
but then be made to be applicable to a specific mission.   Third, due to the lack of experience of 
students, the risk assessment method should help identify initiating events.  Students can 
probably think of critical end states of the satellite, but determining root causes can be more 
difficult.  Finally, the tool must also identify events in a systematic way.  Otherwise, it is likely 
that students will miss certain risks affecting their design.   
Many tools exist for the multiple stages of risk management; different techniques can be 
used to perform a combination of risk identification, assessment, control, or monitoring.  Some 
common techniques include event tree analysis, fault tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA), and master logic diagrams (MLD), and more.  In this section, the different tools 
traditionally used in risk management will be discussed.   
4.1.1 The Top Risk List/Stoplight Diagram 
This method, discussed in Section 3.1.1, is easy for students to understand and create.  It is 
also simple and inexpensive.  However, this process may be too simple because there is no 
systematic way of identifying the entire set of risks.  Risks could also be missed if the team 
identifies the top risks and then does not update the list as the project proceeds.  Combining this 
type of list with a more systematic failure mode identification method could prove useful, 
though. 
4.1.2 Event Tree Analysis 
An event tree examines accident scenarios and looks at the consequences of those events.  In 
other words, it is a technique that first identifies root causes of failures and then critical events 
that affect the progression of the initiating event into an unwanted end state.  As the number of 
events increases, the diagram spreads out like the branches of a tree.  
An event is a statement that can be true or false according to the current state of the system.  
For example, the event “Batteries provide backup to solar panel failure” is either true or false, 
regardless of whether the user knows this information.  A qualitative diagram can be made to 
describe the potential outcomes of the initiating incident.  The possible consequences of the 
primary event are considered, and each of those outcomes is analyzed to determine their 
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potential results.  This process is continued until the end states are reached.  Figure 8 is an 
example of a very simplified event-tree for part of a power subsystem of a satellite.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Example of an Event Tree Analysis for a Solar Panel Failure 
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well.  Once the initiating event has occurred, the next “barrier” is reached.  The barrier, often a 
back-up system, is expected to work in the case that the initiating event occurs.  Branching 
upward in the event-tree means that the event at that stage is true, and branching downward 
means the event failed.  At the end of each path, we have reached an end state, which detail all 
the possible outcomes stemming from the initial event.   
Event trees are useful because they take into account the dynamic nature of complex 
systems and can be easily updated as the design changes.  They also identify risk drivers and end 
states of interest, which can be used in a probabilistic risk assessment (Section 4.1.5).  Event 
trees lead to a large number of outcomes, and oftentimes only some of them are relevant to the 
engineers designing the system.  Therefore, event trees can be inefficient and difficult to manage.  
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equal one, which can be useful during analysis, as long as the probability equaling one is not 
artificially forced to be true.   
4.1.3 Fault Tree and Master Logic Diagram Analysis 
A fault-tree is a graphical technique for top-down analysis used to evaluate specific 
undesired events.  In a fault-tree analysis, the engineer asks the question: How does it fail?  This 
type of analysis works well when the user knows what failures they are afraid of and would like 
to examine how likely they are to occur.  The tree uses deductive logic (and logic gates) to map 
component level failures to a system-wide failure.  
Master logic diagrams (MLD) are similar to fault trees, but they are created at a higher level 
than for what fault trees are typically used.  In addition, fault trees usually utilize formal 
probabilistic analysis, whereas MLDs typically do not.58  Both master logic diagrams and fault 
trees, though, help identify the initiating events that can lead to critical accidents or mission 
failure.   
MLDs and fault trees are started by identifying critical end states, and then failures leading 
to those causes are found.  The top level identifies faults of the system, while the intermediate 
levels are subsystem failures, and the lower levels identify failure modes or causes, called 
initiating events.  While these analyses can be done at different levels of detail, the diagrams are 
considered complete when breaking down a component leads to the same response as the next 
higher level.38  In complex projects, an event tree is developed for each initiating event in the 
MLD.   
The process of creating an MLD or fault tree is iterative.  Once the risk manager or engineer 
begins developing scenarios, they should note similarities and difference in the system response.  
Through the observations, they can refine the diagram and its fault scenarios until a streamlined, 
coherent tree is formed. 
Both master logic diagrams and fault trees use symbols to provide more information about 
the type of failure that is occurring.  Table 6 and Table 7 show the type of gates and blocks used 
in MLDs and fault trees.59   For an example of what MLDs and fault trees look like, see Figure 9. 
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Table 6.  Gates Used in Master Logic Diagrams and Fault Trees 
 
Gate Name Classic 
Symbol 
Description 
 
AND 
 
The output (top) 
event occurs if all 
input (bottom) 
events occur 
 
 
OR 
 
The output (top) 
event occurs if at 
least one input 
(bottom) event 
occurs 
 
 
Table 7.  Blocks Used in the Master Logic Diagrams and Fault Trees 
 
Block Name Classic 
Symbol 
Description 
 
Basic Event 
 
 
 
 
An initiating 
failure or fault 
 
Non-basic 
Failure 
 
 
 
 
A failure or fault 
that is not 
classified as 
“Basic” 
 
Undeveloped 
Event 
 
 
 
An event that is 
not developed 
further 
 
Transfer 
 
 
A block that 
transfers the user 
to a sub tree 
 
 
The basic MLD or fault tree analysis is a commonly used technique, so students can easily 
communicate with professionals about risk with this type of analysis.  They are also less open to 
interpretation than an event tree because of its deductive nature.  A useful aspect of creating fault 
trees is that the probability of the top event can be found by ascribing probabilities to each of the 
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events below it.  If these probabilities are known, then the system unavailability or the failure 
frequency can be found. 
Some disadvantages of fault tree analyses are that they tend to require absolute failure 
modes, and they do not model sequence-dependent failures.  Dynamic fault trees or Markov 
models are needed for dependent failures.   
4.1.4 Event Sequence Diagram 
An event sequence diagram (ESD) is a qualitative graphic representation of the sequence 
events leading up to the end state.  The end state of the sequence may be a failure, a degraded 
state, or a command to move to the next sequence because there has been no failure.  Scenarios 
are typically developed for each phase of the mission: deployment, cruise, reentry, etc.  These 
diagrams use symbols to depict the flow of activity in the sequence, similar to the symbols in a 
fault tree.   
ESDs are good for dynamic systems and can help identify end states of interest.  However, 
they are normally used as part of a larger failure mode identification process and are not very 
useful by themselves.  With a focus on operations, though, event sequence diagrams can also be 
used later in the mission to understand consequences of failures during the mission. 
4.1.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)60 is a much more complex failure mode 
identification method than those discussed so far.  It was developed for risk assessment, but it is 
also used throughout the design phase in trade-off studies to base decisions at least partly on the 
risk of each option. 
A PRA aims to answer more than just what can go wrong.  A PRA helps identify initiating 
events and possible outcomes, calculating the severity of the consequences.  It also will 
determine how likely the failure is to occur, and with what frequency.  Therefore, the PRA 
analyzes every possible failure mode both qualitatively and quantitatively at great detail. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments include many methods of risk analysis, making it time-
consuming and laborious.  PRAs use master logic diagrams to focus in on the most important 
initiating factors.  Then engineering analysis is performed to study what could happen after the 
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initiating event occurs.  Likelihood is determined by inductive methods such as event tree 
analyses or event sequence diagrams or by the deductive fault tree analysis.   
If the PRA is qualitative, the result of the assessment can be given as a two-dimensional 
matrix with consequences and their probabilities.  If the PRA is quantitative, the result is a risk 
curve, which plots the frequency of exceeding a consequence value against the categories of 
consequences.  While a PRA answers many questions relating to risk and safety, it 
understandably consumes time and personnel, and it requires substantial component performance 
data and insight, both of which can be hard to obtain.  Therefore, the PRA is potentially not a 
good match for small projects.    
4.1.6 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)61 is a complex and even more involved way 
to identify failure modes, determine their effect on the operation of the system, and identify 
actions to mitigate the risks of failures.  The FMEA works to solve each of these issues and can 
therefore be a time-consuming assessment as well.  It also is not proficient at modeling common 
cause failures, which occurs when there are two failures that arise because of one initial failure.  
More information on the detailed procedures for FMEA can be seen in the reference.   
4.1.7 Analysis of Options 
The options presented thus far include the top risk list, event trees, fault trees, master logic 
diagrams, event sequence diagrams, probabilistic risk assessment, and failure modes and effects 
analysis.  These are the most common ways to analyze failure modes in industry, so all of these 
tools meet this requirement that was set out in the beginning. 
To decrease the amount of time spent on learning how to do risk management, the method 
chosen should be easy to learn and minimally time consuming when applying it to a specific 
mission.  The PRA and FMEA do not meet either of these needs.  Fault trees are usually very 
detailed and use probabilistic information, making them difficult for a project to tailor the 
method to their need.   
The risk assessment method should help the student identify root causes.  The event tree 
begins by having the engineer identify initiating events, and the event sequence diagram uses the 
operations plan of the mission to find end states, neither of which is best for student use.   
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The tool must also help the engineer systematically identify all appropriate risks.  This rules 
out the stoplight diagram since a systematic method for identifying risk is not used.   
Therefore, the option that meets all of these needs is the master logic diagram.   Master logic 
diagrams are not as complex as an option like a PRA, but they are more advanced than a simple 
Top Risk List.  Like fault trees, they are widely used in industry, and if made correctly, they will 
not take long to apply to a specific mission.  In addition, MLDs do not require probabilistic data, 
and they identify initiating events in a methodical and thorough manner, making them a good 
match for this application to student satellite programs.  Restrictions of the MLD will be 
discussed in Section 4.3.5. 
4.2 Development of a Master Logic Diagram for Small Satellites 
A master logic diagram has been identified as a good framework to outline failures relating 
to small satellites in order to identify pertinent risks.  To create the MLD, major end states must 
be identified first.  Any satellite program has a few end states that would be catastrophic to the 
program.  These include: 
 
1 - Catastrophic failure at or near launch (no data, no proof of function)  
2 - No response from either the bus or the payload on orbit, but otherwise potentially well 
functioning 
 
The result of either of these events happening is that the satellite mission is basically over.  
There are measures that can be tried on orbit to recover the satellite in certain circumstances, but 
if those do not work, the mission has failed.  While the end state is the same, the causes of these 
two types of failures can be very different, but they are equally important.   
Another important consideration in determining the severity of the second end state is when 
the failure occurs.  The success of the mission greatly depends on how much data is returned 
before the failure occurs.  Obviously each of these scenarios offers different amounts of 
engineering or scientific output for the team.  Considering that the second end state can still be 
catastrophic if it occurs before the design life has ended, the MLD will consider both of these 
end states.  
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The next issue to consider is how to make the MLD general enough for any small satellite 
program.  To accomplish this, the master logic diagram has to be broad to be applicable to all 
small programs, but it also needs to be specific enough to adequately help identify failure modes.  
This balance is hard to achieve, but it was accomplished through careful creation and review.   
To create the MLD, the high level failures relating to the failed end states were laid out to 
cover all types of small satellites as well as their interfaces.  At each branch point, observable 
failures were identified in order to fill out the MLD in a complete and user-friendly way.  For 
example, for the end state “No data from the satellite,” one of the observable reasons for this 
might be that there is a problem with the actual satellite because there is no signal transfer.  The 
reasons for the lack of a signal were outlined at the next level, and this process was continued, 
expanding the tree further.   
As the initiating events were identified to be subsystems, such as the thermal or power 
system, the text Space Mission Analysis and Design47 was used to get a basic yet comprehensive 
overview of the components in a satellite.  Since this reference focuses on general satellite 
engineering, it helped to create a universal MLD that covers all satellite designs.  Detailed 
investigations were made into each subsystem to determine what components small satellites 
may use and how they interface with other subsystems.    In addition, an MLD for programmatic 
risks was laid out as a stand-alone diagram.  The MLD was then reviewed at MIT to ensure that 
the layout was consistent and the identification of initiating events was correct.  In the end, 17 
pages of technical risks and one page of programmatic risks were documented.  Figure 9 shows 
part of a tree for a top-level failure of no data from the satellite. 
This method for creating the MLD is very useful for two reasons: identifying failures that 
will cause a bad end state during design and problem solving on-orbit.  While designing the 
satellites, students can trace failure modes through the system and take these failures into 
account when making design, hardware, and software choices.  When something goes wrong 
after launch, given the telemetry that university satellites often receive, the students can use the 
MLD to investigate what could have caused the failure in this way.  All the student satellite 
failures presented in Section 2.4.2 can be found in the MLD by tracing failures through the 
diagram.  Therefore, this MLD template is versatile and useful at any stage in the mission.   
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Figure 9.  Section of a Master Logic Diagram for Small Satellites 
 
4.3 Uses of the Master Logic Diagram 
The master logic diagram is a useful tool at the start of a project, or it can be applied to a 
design if the team has already begun working on the satellite.  The MLD can be used for 
troubleshooting on-orbit, and it can also be used to help teach students about satellite engineering 
in general.   
4.3.1 Beginning a Design 
This risk template can be used in many ways.  When beginning a design, students can learn 
about the satellite as a whole while learning about the types of risks associated with each 
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subsystem and their interfaces.  Students can also identify where most of the risk falls in order to 
plan their resources accordingly. 
   The MLD helps give students a broad picture of the satellite, including the types of 
interactions subsystems have and the possible ways a satellite might fail.  Because of these 
interactions between subsystems, the MLD can show how design decisions made for one 
subsystem can affect other parts of the satellite.  Knowledge of the entire system gives context to 
its technical risks.  Without an all-encompassing view of the risks of a program, the students lack 
sufficient comprehension of the risks and how to mitigate them. 
Interfaces are often poorly specified, and this diagram can help to demonstrate the type and 
number of interfaces that exist.  The MLD can prepare students for what could go wrong in the 
satellite, eliminating some of the surprise of a malfunction and helping the students because they 
have been exposed to the idea of the failure. 
By looking at where the potential greatest risks are for a certain mission, students and 
faculty are more aware of the project’s needs.  Students can learn about specific subsystems and 
their failure modes by studying the relevant portions of the risk template.  This is helpful for 
subsystem engineers in order to better understand their assignment as well as to recognize what 
is risky about their subsystem.  It is also helpful to systems engineers, who need to allocate 
resources such as time, money, and personnel.   
4.3.2 Working with a Design 
The main goal of creating the MLD is to help with risk management when working with a 
satellite that is being designed.  Since the students lack experience in designing satellites and 
identifying risks, they can apply this framework to their project to identify failure modes in their 
program.  This method is intended to help give guidelines to students and to help them 
brainstorm risk modes, but they will still need to tailor the MLD to their own project.  The MLD 
is universal and applicable to nearly every student-run small satellite project, so the students then 
can choose what parts of the diagram are needed based on the design of their satellite; the result 
is an MLD for their project.   
In addition, students can use the MLD to identify single point failures, which many 
programs try to minimize.  With this template, the teams can discuss what single point failures 
exist early on in the project’s life.  Hopefully, by identifying problems early, changes can be 
 92 
made to reduce these failure modes without drastically affecting the design or without costing the 
program time and money.  While all students can use the MLD in some way, one person (or a 
small team) should be dedicated to maintaining and updating the MLD as well as tracking any 
changes to the satellite that result from the use of the MLD. 
4.3.3 In the Classroom 
The MLD can also be used as a teaching tool in the classroom setting, much in the same way 
as students use the MLD at the beginning of a satellite design.  The class can learn the types of 
failures satellite face in addition to learning about graphical fault trees and how these diagrams 
work.  By learning about these methods of risk identification, students will be able to better 
understand how to logically break down a failure into its possible causes and will learn a way to 
diagnose failures in a system.  These skills can extend beyond satellite engineering, but the 
fundamentals can be taught with the MLD.  As mentioned previously, the MLD can help 
students to better understand how the satellite fits together as a whole and how subsystems 
interact.   
4.3.4 Troubleshooting a Design 
Whether during testing or on-orbit, the MLD can be used to troubleshoot a problem.  As 
mentioned before, when a component fails, the engineer tries to find root causes for that failure.  
The MLD helps with this process in many cases because of the way it’s laid out, with upper level 
failures that the team might notice, and then lower level failures branching out from there.  
Solving a problem that occurs in a test or a failure after launch would be easier, faster, and more 
thorough if the MLD is used.   
4.3.5 Restrictions of the MLD 
Using the MLD can help student teams to identify failure modes, but there are some caveats 
to using the MLD.  First, there are some areas that the MLD does not cover.  For example, it 
might be necessary to add items to the MLD for certain projects for complex subsystems or 
missions that are testing a new technology.  Or, a team may wish to make the MLD into more of 
a fault tree, outlining failures down to extreme detail.  Adding items to the MLD is best done by 
the senior members on the project or during a team review.  The high risk of a catastrophic 
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launch vehicle failure does not appear in the MLD in an amount proportional to how often this 
failure occurs in the real world.  Schools must remember that launch vehicle failure is a very 
prominent threat and should plan accordingly.   
Some design risks are included, but operational risks are not included everywhere in the 
MLD because there are just too many variations.  For example, the team can decide to put solar 
panels on all sides or increase battery capability in case the first orientation of the solar panels 
fails.  These types of design decisions are everywhere in an engineering project and cannot be 
accounted for in a set framework such as this.  The MLD does include under-design and 
component failures as risks, and given the purpose of the MLD, this is suitable.  One other area 
not included in the MLD is organizational and programmatic risks.  Those sorts of risks can 
cause a failure at any point, and a team must just be aware of those reasons for failure even 
though they are not in the MLD.  Most failure mode analysis options cannot include these types 
of failures, so the MLD is not inadequate for the job; however, the teams must just keep this in 
mind when designing their satellite using any failure mode analysis option, including the MLD. 
Other areas of risk not apparent in the MLD are technology development risk and human 
error in design.  Technology development risk is included in component failures since every part 
can fail due to not having enough maturity in the design.  The engineers just must be aware of 
the ways in which a part can fail, and its development level is a part of that list.  The latter risk is 
hard to incorporate into any failure mode analysis program, just like design, operational, or 
programmatic risks.  All of these types of failures must be considered by the team, but they are 
not included in the MLD. 
Second, the MLD only fulfills the first two steps of risk management – understanding risk in 
relation to a project and risk identification.  There are still three more steps – analyzing the 
impact of the failure modes, implementing a mitigation strategy, and tracking and updating risks.  
The schools do have to create an overarching risk mitigation plan and implement that in 
conjunction with the MLD, but the MLD provides the necessary start.  It may be that starting a 
risk program is difficult for student teams, and that’s why not many schools have risk strategies, 
so having the MLD focus on the first two steps is helpful.  Schools can choose how to implement 
the last three steps of the risk management process to best suit their needs.  It is imperative that 
the program management or systems engineering team not only use the MLD, but also decide 
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how to incorporate the MLD into a larger risk management program.  Some suggestions can be 
found in Section 3.1, and the process is detailed in Section 5.4.   
Third, even though the MLD is high-level and will be scaled down to apply just to the 
specific project, it is possible that an MLD may be overwhelming to non-experienced students 
because of its size.  Given this template, students may attempt to fix as many of the risks as they 
can.  This could waste time and resources needed elsewhere on the project.  However, if 
managed correctly, this weakness could be avoided, and the MLD could be used as intended. 
4.4 Benefits in Risk Mitigation Using the MLD 
This MLD framework allows engineers to reduce much of the risk associated with 
university-run satellite programs.  While not all the risks detailed in previous sections will be 
mitigated, the MLD does reduce risks associated with programmatic differences, funding and 
schedule, experience, and documentation.  
4.4.1 Programmatic Difference Benefits 
Universities have fewer resources to dedicate to all the tasks needed to create a satellite, and 
risk management is a task that often gets pushed aside.  The MLD begins the process of risk 
management, giving the programs a way to identify failure modes of the satellite with little 
experience or effort on the part of the school.  However, the MLD is still able to teach about 
failure modes and make students more aware of risks since the entire template is laid out for 
them.   
Since many universities have informal risk management programs, the MLD is useful 
because it provides a structured risk identification format.  Due to the method for creating the 
MLD, it can identify all the risks related to a critical end state in a systematic way.  This makes 
the diagram beneficial for students who often don’t fully understand all the components of a 
satellite yet.  In essence, universities have a programmatic risk of risk management failure, and 
the MLD helps to reduce this programmatic risk.   
4.4.2 Funding and Schedule Benefits 
While the MLD template does not directly help a project receive funding, risk management 
is a necessary part of a program review. When competing for funding, whether against other 
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universities or not, a program with a clear risk management plan will portray a more advanced 
and well-managed program, increasing its chances of funding.  When university programs are 
applying for funding, the MLD will help to fulfill the need for identifying risks.   
Funding affects nearly every aspect of the design, and when programs are deciding where to 
allocate funding, more effort should be focused on risky components than other less-risky 
systems.  By using the MLD, high-risk areas can be identified and given more resources in terms 
of funding and schedule.  If done early on in the program, resources can be allocated more 
wisely, saving the team money and helping to keep the project on schedule.     
4.4.3 Experience-related Benefits 
Many of the benefits relating to the lack of experience of students were discussed in Section 
4.4, where it is explained that the MLD helps students identify failure modes and understand 
subsystem interactions better.  Students can better make observations about risk on their 
subsystems if they have a template from which to work.  The MLD also provides a bigger picture 
of the risks facing the satellite, which decreases the students’ learning curve and increases their 
knowledge of the entire system.  With this broad view of all the failure modes, the students can 
better determine how risk mitigation techniques affect the whole project and their subsystems.   
4.4.4 Documentation Benefits 
Documentation is a fundamental part of transferring knowledge from one team to the next.  
Using an MLD such as this provides a better way to document risk so that communicating failure 
modes to future members is easier.  Turnover is a large problem in student organizations, and 
having a template in which to document risks can help transfer knowledge because it will take 
less time to record the information.  By providing a template for the identification of risks, the 
reporting of risks will have a consistent format across the program.  The MLD also gives a 
central place to store information so that information on risks is not lost within a team.  In 
addition, if schools want to share information, lessons learned, current risks to subsystems, etc., 
they can do so more easily with a consistent layout. 
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Chapter 5: Application of the MLD to the Mars 
Gravity Biosatellite  
Chapter 5 details the application of the MLD to the Mars Gravity Biosatellite (MGB).  The 
background of the Mars Gravity project is discussed, including its attempts at risk management.   
Three experiments to measure the value of the MLD are presented, and the five step risk 
management process is outlined again, this time focused on student projects.  Finally, the 
outcomes and benefits of utilizing the MLD on the Mars Gravity Biosatellite are detailed.   
5.1 The Mars Gravity Biosatellite  
5.1.1 Program Overview 
The Mars Gravity Biosatellite is a project run jointly between the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) and the Georgia Institute of Technology.  Its goal is to build a satellite system 
that will send 15 mice into low earth orbit, spin the spacecraft to simulate the gravity of Mars, 
and then bring the mice back to study the effects of partial gravity on mammalian physiology.  
This research satellite will help us to understand current medical uncertainties regarding long-
term spaceflight, helping engineers to better design systems to keep astronauts healthy during 
their voyages to the Moon and Mars.   
The Mars Gravity Biosatellite program was started in August of 2001, and over 500 students 
have been involved to date.  The team consists of approximately 30 people each semester, with 
the majority being undergraduates led by about five graduate students.  The program manager is 
involved in the project part-time, so the effort is mostly student-led.  The team gets ad hoc 
support from industry throughout the design process, and there is more formal participation of 
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industry personnel at reviews.  The project is funded mostly on grants through NASA, the 
National Space Biomedical Research Institute, and the participating schools.  Since the 
program’s inception, it has raised approximately 1.3 million dollars in direct funding and 
$300,000 as in-kind donations, but this does not nearly meet the needs of the program to reach 
launch.62     
The Mars Gravity Biosatellite consists of three main sections: the Payload, the Entry, 
Descent, and Landing (EDL), and the Bus.  The Payload provides life support to the mice and 
collects scientific data for the investigators.  The EDL helps bring the Payload back safely 
through the Earth’s atmosphere to the ground.  The EDL and Payload together form the Reentry 
Vehicle.  The purpose of the Bus is to help the satellite stay in orbit and function off the Bus’ 
power, communication, cooling, and other support services.  In addition to the satellite itself, the 
system also requires a launch vehicle, a ground station network, and ground support equipment.  
With a mass of approximately 500 kilograms, this satellite is much larger than normal student 
missions and just fits within the range of satellites that is commonly classified as small (0-500 
kg).4 
No major technical setbacks have occurred on Mars Gravity, but the program has had its 
share of programmatic risks over its lifetime.  The satellite was supposed to launch in 2005, but 
primarily due to funding, the schedule slipped considerably.  Another factor in the launch delay 
was the underestimation of time that it takes for inexperienced students to design and build such 
a complex satellite.   
The turnover rate of students is also extremely high (usually at least 50% per semester), and 
one reason may be that the demands of class work are too much for the undergraduates to 
balance research as well as class.  The high turnover rate means that the graduate student 
managers must be involved in recruitment and training every semester, which uses up a lot of 
time.  Finally, documentation is a serious problem with the Mars Gravity program.  With busy 
students and high turnover, adequately documenting work sometimes does not happen.  Efforts 
to better this situation, such as configuration control and end of semester reports and 
presentations, have helped this problem some.   
As can be seen from its challenging mission and program issues, Mars Gravity is a complex 
student mission, but the focus on student education and the lack of resources is the same as other 
 99 
university projects.  Therefore, this satellite is considered to be in the same class as the other 
small, student satellite missions discussed so far.     
5.1.2 Previous Risk Management on Mars Gravity 
Throughout its five years in existence, the Mars Gravity program has had very little focus on 
risk management.  It is difficult to ascertain whether the lack of risk management has caused 
programmatic or technical failures, but it has certainly not helped.    
From early on in the program, high-level science and engineering requirements were 
specified.  The only way that risk was tracked was through these requirements.  The 
requirements were tracked in an Excel spreadsheet and were tied to four items – priority, risk, 
maturity, and status.  The intent of this list was to make sure that the requirements were focused 
on in a way that kept the students thinking broadly about the systems engineering issues at hand.  
While only one of these categories is actually labeled “risk,” all of them do deal with risk 
management, as identified in the process outlined in Section 2.1.1.  This system did not work 
well because it was not maintained nor was it a complete risk assessment.  By using the 
requirements, the student team got a good look at some of the risks, but identifying risks in this 
manner does not cover all the possible risks.  Also, of the requirements identified, not all of them 
were assigned risk levels.  In general, this plan was not thorough, and the Mars Gravity team 
lacked the systems engineering focus to put a better system in place.     
Another risk management method attempted was to use a descope plan.  This kind of plan 
does not cover the actual risk management steps, but it does help the team think about other 
options for the project if something goes wrong, reducing some of the programmatic risks 
discussed earlier.  A descope plans was started for MGB, but it was not kept up to date because 
of a lack of strong systems engineering focus on the team at the time.   
5.2 Why the MLD was Applied to Mars Gravity 
The Mars Gravity Biosatellite was in need of a consistent and easy-to-follow risk 
management program.  It has been seen, in the MGB program, that students are young and 
inexperienced, and they have trouble maintaining documentation with such a high rate of 
turnover.  It was also a problem in the past that the systems engineering team could not 
adequately manage risks, and these plans often were neglected.   As shown in Section 4.1, a 
 100
master logic diagram is a good match for university groups in order to help the students identify 
failure modes in the program in a consistent and well-documented manner.  In addition, it is 
necessary to test the usefulness of the MLD before suggesting it as a tool to the small satellite 
community.   Therefore, it was decided to apply the MLD to Mars Gravity in order to see the 
utility of the master logic diagram tool.   
The two end states presented in Section 4.2 apply to Mars Gravity.  These states are 
“Catastrophic failure at or near launch” and “No response on orbit but otherwise potentially well 
functioning.”  On Mars Gravity, science output is roughly seen as62: 
− 24% in-flight collected data  
− 60% post-flight dissection and analysis 
− 9% post-flight behavioral/function (i.e. live) analysis 
− 7% post-flight specimen recovery from waste collection module 
As one can see, especially on this science focused mission, keeping the payload in good 
condition and getting back data is key to even partial mission success.  To have no response from 
the satellite would lead to complete science data loss and potential reentry problems because of 
the lack of communication.  For the mission even to reach half of its goals, the payload must be 
returned, meaning that either of the two previous end states would be disastrous for this mission.  
Therefore, the general MLD will be useful for the Mars Gravity Biosatellite.   
One other catastrophic failure would be to have the satellite hit something outside of its 
landing ellipse once it has reentered.  Since Mars Gravity is returning the payload to Earth, a 
number of failure modes that are not standard for university missions are introduced.  These 
types of risks are not captured in the MLD that was created for the end states above; therefore, a 
failure of hitting something outside of the landing ellipse would require a smaller, different 
MLD.  Since this type of failure is so specific to Mars Gravity, it will not be discussed further. 
Despite the few pitfalls of the MLD, it was applied to the Mars Gravity project to help 
understand the context of the risks in the project and the possible failure modes.  To do this, only 
those sections that apply to the Mars Gravity project were kept in the framework.  In this 
manner, the MLD was used to start the risk management process for Mars Gravity, and its 
incorporation into the rest of the five step process is discussed in Section 5.4.  Before proceeding 
with the rest of the risk management process, the next section shows how the MLD proved to be 
good at identifying both the types and the number of failure modes. 
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5.3 Comparison of Identification of Risks Using the MLD and Other 
Common Methods  
To see whether the MLD is better than other risk identification techniques, two tests were 
conducted.  The first was to compare brainstorming risks with using the MLD.  The second was 
to compare how well students could identify risk with little to no proper training.  To do both of 
these tests, the focus was on a power system failure because power system failures are a common 
occurrence in many mechanical systems.  This gave the subjects in the tests a more equal basis 
for being able to identify risks since students across multiple majors and levels of degrees were 
used in the experiments.  Then, the MLD will be analyzed to show that it can be useful for 
identifying the number of failures in each subsystem once the satellite is on-orbit.   
5.3.1 Brainstorming vs. the MLD 
In the first experiment, the result of a brainstorming session was compared to the MLD for 
the power subsystem.  A brainstorming activity to identify reasons that there might be a power 
problem on the satellite was done by a graduate student member of the systems engineering team 
that was responsible for risk identification.  This risk assessment was done without proper 
training or a framework for risk identification.  No resources were used for this brainstorming 
diagram.  Figure 10 shows the risks associated with no power in a preliminary brainstorm for the 
Mars Gravity Biosatellite, where no formal technique was used to identify risks.   
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Figure 10.  Preliminary Risk Brainstorm for Power Failures 
 
It can be seen that there is a varying level of detail in the types and number of components 
identified.  For example, the converter is included as an initiating failure, but items such as the 
regulator or distribution system are not.  Mechanical hardware is not really considered in this 
brainstorm, and some interfaces are missing, such as the thermal issues, which might prevent 
components from working because the temperature is out of the appropriate range.   In short, this 
brainstorm of power failures is missing many key failure modes.   
Next, the MLD was applied to the Mars Gravity project in the area of power to show how 
part of the MLD would be applied for a real application and to compare the results to the 
brainstorming activity.  Figure 11 displays the final MLD for a power failure on the Mars 
Gravity satellite. 
 
 103 
 
Figure 11.  “No Power” branch of the MLD for the Mars Gravity Biosatellite 
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Figure 11 only shows a few levels of detail, but it aims to be consistent about the level of 
detail it includes.  Additions could easily be made to make the MLD more in depth, if the project 
desires.  For example, under degradation due to the space environment, additional events could 
be added for materials, lubricant, coating, thermal expansion, and space debris.  An MLD is 
supposed to be a high-level fault tree, so a program can determine how much detail is needed.  
With the MLD in general, though, students are better aware of the specific threats within more 
general categories.   
To see the utility of the MLD, one can compare Figure 10 and Figure 11.  The master logic 
diagram returns considerably more data on the risks relevant to the satellite.  It is better able to 
capture a complete set of risks over the entire satellite by providing a consistent and 
comprehensive framework for identifying risks.  This framework also follows a logical path from 
the end state to the initiating events.   
Conversely, a simple brainstorming activity, such as in Figure 10, has less utility because 
there is no unifying factor, such as an program-level detrimental end state, motivating the 
assessment.  It also might be incomplete and biased toward the experiences of the people 
identifying the risks. 
As with the identification of risks in any technique, the risks and their mitigation strategies 
will have an effect on the design of the satellite.  The MLD ensures that risks over the entire 
satellite are noted, which is important information to have when considering design choices that 
affect an entire satellite.   
These figures show that the MLD is able to better capture a complete set of risks for a 
satellite project than a brainstorming technique can.   In general, this is true of many current 
university practices because none of them provide a consistent method for identifying risks, 
while the MLD does.  Thus far, it seems that a master logic diagram provides a good framework 
with which to work.   
5.3.2 Risk Identification Experiment 
To confirm whether the MLD is able to help undergraduate students identify failure modes, 
an experiment was carried out at MIT.  Thirteen mechanical, operations research, and aerospace 
engineering students were asked to create an MLD for the failure modes that might be associated 
with there being no power on the satellite.  They were given an example for the communication 
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subsystem to help guide them on the level of detail desired.  The students were allowed to use 
any resources except the MLD, and they were asked to return the experiment within a few days.   
To see how well the students could identify risks, the results from the students were 
compared with the MLD section shown in Figure 11, which has 56 failure modes identified for 
the end state of “No Power.”  When comparing the student work and the MLD, the student was 
counted as identifying a failure mode correctly when their lowest level of failure mode in a chain 
also occurred for the same reason in the MLD, even if their level of detail was not the same as 
the MLD.  For example, if the student specified that an interface could fail, but in reality you 
have three different interfaces (mechanical, data, and electrical), the student was given one point.  
If they correctly identified all three interfaces, then they got three points.  An incorrect 
identification of a failure mode resulted in a point in the “Incorrect” column.  This occurred 
when the student flowed events incorrectly, gave the wrong reason for failure, or included parts 
not used on satellites (e.g. turbine blades).  If a student identified the same risk more than once, 
that was ok, but if they only included the risk twice because the organization was poor, they did 
not receive points for the second time they identified the same risk.  Table 8 shows the results 
when the students performed this risk identification task. 
Table 8.  Student Experience & Number of Failure Modes Identified for “No Power”  
Student Schooling Student Experience # 
Correct 
# 
Incorrect 
1.  Undergrad Freshman Undecided 8 1 
2.  Undergrad Freshman Undecided 18 1 
3.  Undergrad Freshman Aerospace Eng major 14 1 
4.  Undergrad Freshman Aerospace Eng major 19 0 
5.  Undergrad Junior Mech Eng major, 1 summer on satellite project 14 0 
6.  Undergrad Senior Mech Eng major, 1 summer on satellite project 7 0 
7.  Bachelor’s Degree BS in Operations Engineering 10 0 
8.  Master’s Student BS in Mechanical Eng, MS in Aerospace 
Engineering (in progress) 
9 0 
9.  Master’s Student BS in Aerospace Engineering, MS in 
Aerospace Engineering (in progress) 
6 2 
10.  Master’s Student BS in Aerospace Engineering, MS in 
Aerospace Engineering (in progress) 
17 2 
11.  Master’s Student BS in Mechanical Eng, MS in Aerospace 
Engineering (in progress), 1 year on 
satellite project 
23 0 
12.  Master’s Student BS in Mechanical Eng, 1 year on project 29 0 
13.  PhD Student BS and MS in Mechanical Eng 8 0 
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It should be noted first that neither age nor experience seem to help identify failure modes.  
This is counterintuitive, but it is probably due to the small sample size of students that 
participated in the study.  This result is not as important, though, as how the students responded 
and what their strengths and weaknesses were.  Some of the students showed good insight into 
technical problems and the design of a satellite, but this was not true for the majority.  In addition 
to the fact that students could not identify many of the failure modes, they also fell into a number 
of pitfalls.   
While Student 1 focused solely on the solar panels not working, he was able to identify other 
parts of the subsystem as being a cause of the failure, including regulation and distribution 
failures.  He was also able to see that the problem might be recursive.  Students 1 and 2 
understood that the power subsystem connects to other subsystems, but they did not know what 
those subsystems were.  These two students showed a characteristic of beginning to understand 
the complexity of the system, but they could not yet see the big picture.   
The third student not only identified major components of the power subsystem, but he was 
also able to identify other aspects of the power management system as well.  His knowledge of 
the entire satellite was lacking, so his ability to identify failure modes in the power subsystem 
could have been from previous experience and not from general satellite design knowledge.  This 
student demonstrated another common student problem – organization.  The students were given 
an example of an MLD and told how to go through the process, but some students had a lot of 
repetition and were not well organized.   
Student 5 was an undergraduate that had worked for a summer on the power subsystem of a 
satellite project.  He identified most of the general failure methods but did not go into enough 
detail (even though the level of detail was shown in the instructions).  It was expected that this 
student would have been able to identify many of the failure modes because of his previous 
experience with the power system, but it was surprising that he did not.  This could have 
potentially been either because he did not have enough time or enough knowledge.   
Student 6 did not include a number of major components, including the solar panels, and he 
only identified a few of the smaller components (such as converters, but not regulators).  This 
student’s experience was in the thermal subsystem, and most of the failure modes that he 
identified related to thermal issues, which indicates that the student was biased toward his 
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experience and was unable to identify the breadth of failure modes.  Finally, the list of failure 
modes had very little organization. 
Student 7 did not have much experience with space systems, although he does follow its 
major news, and he admitted to knowing little about the internal workings of the power 
subsystem.  However, this person is familiar with cars and performed his failure mode 
identification using cars as a reference, which helped to at least identify some of the failure 
modes.  The major problem in this case was that he did not of know the components that 
comprise the power subsystem nor of the resources in which to find this information.  He did, 
though, logically step through many of the potential power options and some of the subsystems 
they were connected to.  
Student 8 was the first student to not identify any of the interfaces to other subsystems.  
Most students do see some connections and include those, but it is also likely that some students 
are not able to identify connections to other parts of the satellite at all.  Student 9 has extensive 
experience in the airline industry, and his failure mode identifications were highly skewed 
toward that knowledge.  In this case, he did not seek further information on satellites and created 
his failure mode tree with incorrect knowledge, resulting in a nearly useless list.     
Student 11 was able to identify many of the failure modes and had good grasp on how the 
power subsystem can fail due to other subsystems.  However, he was missing a number of the 
components of the power subsystem.  His diagram did have decent organization and a sensible 
hierarchy.  Jumping ahead to Student 13, he was unable to identify many of the components of 
satellite’s power system, but this might been because of his background or perhaps a hurried 
attempt to complete the form, even though the students were given a few days to fill out their 
fault tree. 
Most likely due to his education and experience with satellite projects, Student 12 was able 
to identify many more of the failure modes of the satellite.  There were no major errors, 
omissions, or biases in the identification of power failures.  In a couple of places, the student 
missed a few risks or did not go into enough detail, and that is why he wasn’t able to get the full 
set of risks.   
While this experiment had a small pool of subjects, it still shows a number of interesting 
trends for when students try to identify failure modes.  First, students need a structure to help 
them organize their thoughts on a complex system.  Lack of experience with satellites combined 
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with inconsistent organization led to a hodgepodge identification of failure modes.  Second, if 
the students did have experience in a field outside aerospace engineering, it biased their results 
when asked to identify failure modes for a satellite’s power system.  Sometimes this knowledge 
helped them to identify any failure modes at all, but other times it hindered their thinking about 
satellite missions.   
Third, students could not fully identify interfaces to other parts of the satellite.  Oftentimes, 
they understood the mission’s complexity, but they were not able to list out all of those relations.  
This is a major problem because many failures come from other subsystems, so those interfaces 
must be identified.  Lastly, it’s not surprising that students couldn’t identify all of the 
components of a power system.  Many of the students hadn’t studied this subsystem, and some of 
the students only had in classes.  However, in all cases, the students could have used any 
resources for identifying failure modes, but they chose not to or did not know where to find the 
information. 
While students in satellite projects will have more time and potentially more subject-area 
knowledge compared with the subjects in this study, this experiment still shows that an MLD can 
be a useful tool in identifying failure modes.  While the Mars Gravity Biosatellite has not yet 
flown, these two case studies prove that a general yet adaptable tool for failure mode 
identification, such as a master logic diagram, is needed for student-run satellite programs. 
5.3.3 MLD Comparison with Launched Satellite Failures 
The MLD has proven to be useful for recognizing the types of failures in student-satellite 
missions, but it may also be useful for identifying the number of failures in each subsystem once 
the satellite is on-orbit.  To see if the probability of a subsystem failing manifested itself in the 
MLD, the number of failure modes per subsystem was compared to the average failure mode 
rates of satellites that have flown.  The data for launched satellites comes from Section 2.4.4.  In 
the MLD, each subsystem’s fault trees were investigated, and the number of failure modes was 
counted.  To better compare the theoretical master logic diagram with actual space missions, 
only failure modes were counted that were not redundant.  For example, if five different types of 
insulation were listed, only “insulation” was counted in the number of failure modes.  It was 
assumed that student satellites would not use a lot of redundant parts and that not all types of, for 
example, ACS equipment were needed, so a sample set was chosen.  Therefore, it can be 
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assumed that the number of failure modes in each system is also an estimated average.  Table 9 
shows the results of this comparison. 
In Table 9, the third line shows the sum of the ACS and GN&C failures because the 
majority of the systems that have flown record GN&C, ACS, and related software failures all 
together.   The sum of the GN&C and ACS failures is not included in the calculations of the 
percentages of subsystem failures in the MLD since they are already included independently, so 
that column does not add up to 100%.   
 
Table 9.  Percentage of Failure Modes per Subsystem in the MLD Compared to the 
Percentage of Failures per Subsystem for Launched Satellites3 
 
Subsystem # Failure Modes Per Subsystem in MLD
Subsystem Failure 
Mode % in MLD
On-Orbit Satellite 
Subsystem Failure %
GN&C 24 7.3% n/a
ACS 54 16.5% 19.0%
Sum of GNC & ACS 78 23.8% 26.0%
Propulsion 47 14.3% 10.0%
Structures 34 10.4% 3.8%
C&DH 28 8.5% 6.5%
Communication 22 6.7% 5.6%
Thermal 63 19.2% 1.0%
Power 56 17.1% 16.4%
 
 
This comparison is valid only in general terms because there are a number of differences 
between the MLD and missions that have flown.  For the on-orbit failure rate, other subsystems 
that caused failure are not included in this comparison.  These include the launch vehicle, kick 
motors, the payload, program management, operations, and unknown error sources.  The launch 
vehicle is not counted in this table because the comparison would be totally different – the MLD 
shows how the launch vehicle can damage the satellite, whereas the percentage from industry 
shows the number of catastrophic failures due to LV errors.  The payload can cause many 
mission-ending failures, but it is not included much in the MLD because the payload’s failures 
depend highly on the design and the mission chosen, making it a bad fit for a general MLD.  
                                                 
iii
 The On-Orbit “Sum of GNC & ACS” average includes GN&C, ACS, and related software failures, as is normally 
recorded by industry.   
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Software is included in the subsystem failures, and operations are scattered throughout but not 
often included as a root error since that is hard to classify before the mission.  So, many of the 
failures that on-orbit satellites see are not considered for the MLD because their rates of 
occurrence in the MLD are low due to the focus of the MLD and the way it’s laid out.   
Another difference is that the mission purpose leads to certain types of failures, which skews 
the percentage of failures for a given subsystem.  For example, missions that need to slew a lot 
run out of propulsion often, and that subsystem is held responsible for the mission failure.  Since 
student missions have different goals, their failure modes might not be exactly the same as the 
missions that have flown.  Finally, failures have different probabilities, but the MLD assumes 
that everything in the diagram has the same probability.  Many components are more reliable 
than others, but assigning probability in the MLD is out of the scope of this study and is 
unnecessary for this comparison.  Therefore, equal probability of failures will be used, and the 
two sets of percentages can be generally compared.   
Looking at Table 9, one can see that most of the subsystems have percentages similar to 
each other when comparing the two columns.  There are major differences, though, for the 
structures and thermal subsystems.  In these two, the number of possible failure modes is much 
higher than the failures experienced on orbit.  This result has multiple reasons, but the best 
explanation for reduced failures on orbit is pre-launch testing.  Failures in these two subsystems 
are usually due to infant mortality and are caught by testing.  Every satellite goes through 
extensive structural loading, vibration, vacuum, and thermal testing to qualify for flight.  
Because of these tests, which have a long and mature history, problems are caught before the 
satellite is launched, reducing the number of on-orbit failures drastically.  The environment for 
structures and thermal is also well-known, so there are fewer surprises on orbit, also reducing the 
number of failures.  Other subsystems have a harder time testing as if they were in the space 
environment.   Most of the other systems include sensitive components, including software and 
electronics.  These systems are hard to fully test before launch, and many aspects of space can be 
detrimental to those parts, making failure more likely.   
It can be seen from this study that the number of times a subsystem failure appears in the 
MLD may be related to the probability of failure on orbit, except for structures and thermal.  
Since the MLD shows the probability of a subsystem occurring, another step in the risk 
management process is partially done by the MLD.  Universities should take this into 
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consideration when thinking about what their high risks items are and where to focus their 
attention.   
5.4 Risk Management Process 
It has been shown that the master logic diagram is a useful tool for helping students to 
identify risks in a thorough, organized, and unbiased manner.  Now that the MLD is developed, it 
is necessary to incorporate it into the risk management process.  As discussed in Section 2.1.1, 
the steps of risk management are: 
1. Understand the system and what constitutes a risk 
2. Identify the risks 
3. Analyze the risks 
4. Make a plan for risk mitigation 
5. Monitor and update the risks 
 
The MLD helps cover the first two steps of this process; if the students have in mind what 
the program defines as risky, they can study the MLD and apply it to the university’s program.  
There are many ways to continue the process of risk management, and some of those methods 
were outlined and discussed in Section 3.1. 
To keep track of the MLD, it was put on the internet for general viewing purposes.  This 
way, all students would have access to the template, so they have the advantages of using and 
seeing it without being able to edit it without approval.  The MLD should be kept under 
configuration control, requiring a change order for anyone on the team to make changes to it.  In 
fact, all important design documents should be kept under configuration control.  This ensures 
that the whole team agrees on the modifications and is aware of them.  It is best for one person to 
be in charge of the MLD, and for the Mars Gravity mission, this is the Systems Engineer.  This 
person is the main one responsible for the MLD’s upkeep and making sure that the entire process 
is flowing as needed.   
The third step of the management plan, analyzing the risks, can be very time consuming and 
overwhelming for student projects.  Usually this analysis involves identifying the probability, 
severity, and timeframe of the risks.  Some general guidelines for these steps follow.  Assigning 
probability to every risk can be horribly time consuming because of the difficulty in gathering 
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information.  It is recommended not to assign probabilities to each independent risk because 
student groups do not have the experience or the resources to spend on this task.   Instead, the 
team should look at the likelihood of the risks occurring.  This likelihood was shown in the MLD 
by the number of failure modes that occur in each subsystem.  The team can use this information 
in a general way by giving the risks qualitative rankings of low, medium, and high, or numerical 
rankings based on those types of categories.  The likelihoods can be color-coded (usually red, 
yellow, and green) to make the table easier to read.  The university does not have to use the 
probabilities from the MLD, of course, but they should classify likelihood in some way in order 
to have a better idea of how possible the failures are.   
The MLD also helps evaluate the severity of each risk.  First, the risks are important because 
each relates to a catastrophic end state.  Second, the MLD shows the impact of a failure on other 
subsystems since they are interconnected in the MLD.  The team should indicate the severity of 
the risks so that resources such as time, money, and personnel can be allocated accordingly.  
MITRE, a Federally Funded Research and Development Corporation that has a large focus in 
risk management, details the levels of severity as follows62: 
1. Catastrophic - Complete mission failure, death, or loss of system (inability to achieve 
minimum acceptable requirements). 
2. Critical - Major mission degradation, major cost or schedule increases, severe injury, 
occupational illness or major system damage. 
3. Moderate - Minor mission degradation, small cost or schedule increase, injury, minor 
occupational illness, or minor system damage. 
4. Negligible - Less than minor mission degradation, injury, occupational illness, or minor 
system damage. 
The labels or numbers for severity can be used when assigning this attribute to the failure 
modes, and color can again be used to help distinguish between categories (where both 
“moderate” and “negligible” are green).  Lastly, the timeframe of each risk can also be tracked to 
make sure that the risks don’t delay the project.   
It is important to note that not all of the risks must be maintained in this manner.  The 
engineering and program management can decide on the top risks and only analyze those failure 
modes for likelihood, severity, and timeframe.  This method is used by many universities and 
industry projects, but the MLD must be used beforehand to identify the complete set of risks 
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related to the satellite.  Using the Top Risk List to focus in on the most important risks will save 
time over working with all the risks in the MLD, but the team must also periodically review the 
list to make sure that the top risks are still correct.  The Mars Gravity team took the Top Risk 
List approach – the systems engineering lead of the satellite studied the MLD and identified the 
top risks perceived to be affecting the mission, but the exact number of risks to be specified was 
not set beforehand.  The payload and EDL engineers also identified risks from their systems that 
were not already identified by the MLD.  This was necessary since the complexity of the Mars 
Gravity project is not fully captured by the MLD, but this step should not be needed for simpler, 
smaller missions.   
Then, the likelihood, severity, and timeframe of each risk were evaluated and recorded on 
the same sheet.  The list was agreed upon by the program manager, science director, and the 
leads of the payload, EDL, bus, and systems engineering teams.  This entire step took just about 
1.5 hours to complete, and the risk management plan was officially in place.  This was a 
nonscientific means to identify the top risks, but for a student project, it certainly got everyone 
thinking about risk as a team.   
Once the risks are analyzed for these factors, a mitigation approach is needed.  Preferably in 
the same document, the team should decide on the plan of action for each risk.  This group 
should outline the mitigation method, decision points, and tests to verify that the risk has been 
reduced.  If it works out in the timing, the decision points can be all at the same time, allowing 
the team to review the risks together.   
The last critical step in the risk management process is to maintain the risk lists.  It was 
decided on the Mars Gravity team that the process of creating the top risk list should be repeated 
once a semester.  However, both the MLD and the top risk list must be monitored throughout the 
semester by a systems engineer to add changes or updates to the MLD and the risk statuses.   
Continuing with Mars Gravity’s implementation, the next step was to have the team leads 
decide on a mitigation strategy for the risks pertaining to their subsystems.  To show an example, 
the risk list and mitigation plans for Mars Gravity are shown in Table 10.  If these risks also 
affected other subsystems, the first team brought that to the attention of the affected team to 
decide upon a solution.  At each systems team meeting, the agenda would include a risk 
discussion, and any concerns the team was having would be brought to the group.  If the systems 
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engineer noticed any deadlines coming up, he or she could also bring those risks up for 
discussion.   
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Table 10.  Mars Gravity Top Risk List and Mitigation Plan 
Top Risk List How this failure occurs 
Likelihood 
(1-3) 
Severity 
(1-4) 
Time-
frame Mitigation Plan 
Stuck thruster Parts not reliable 3 1 PDR Space proven parts 
Electrical Failure Radiation, Parts not reliable 3 1 PDR Space proven parts, redundancy  
Bus batteries fail Physical and electric system not well designed 2 1 PDR Space proven parts, ground testing 
Software failure Lack of testing and not robust enough 1 2 CDR Contract out software, test thoroughly 
On-board communication failure Comm equipment fails, or C&DH fails 3 2 PDR Space proven parts 
Solar panels not drawing enough 
power System not designed correctly, or parts fail 1 1 PDR 
Account for all power needs while designing 
panels; heritage 
Not enough power for deployment 
series  
Batteries under-designed, panels not deployed 
fast enough 2 1 PDR 
Design operations sequence for nominal and 
off-nominal, size batteries for this purpose 
CG unstable  Mass over budget, mass not well distributed 3 1 PDR 
Account for all mass, move mass toward 
nose, ballast in heatshield nose, verify CG 
location through ground testing 
LV catastrophic failure LV fails independent of satellite 1 1 PDR 
Choose low cost option with risk as a 
secondary concern 
Thermal Interface, Bus to Payload System not designed correctly, or parts fail 1 1 CDR 
Model and analyze the system with FEM and 
Matlab; heritage; re-do calculations for how 
much thermal energy will really exit payload 
Computer fails, can't re-enter or 
run payload Single-string computer fails 2 1 
PDR/ 
CDR 
In case main processor fails: redundant 
reentry microcontroller system and 
redundant life support microcontrollers 
system 
Payload batteries fail Physical and electric system not well designed 2 1 PDR Space proven parts, ground testing 
Mice die of radiation  Solar flare 3 1 Launch 
Launch at a time when solar flares are not 
predicted 
Water leaks in payload and floods 
mouse Punctured water reservoir 3 2 PDR 
Design 15 reservoirs so that if one fails we 
still have 14 mice alive 
TPS failure 
Entry not the designed correctly, heat load 
exceeds design loads 1 1 
PDR/ 
CDR 
Arcjet testing of TPS, high fidelity 
aerothermal simulation 
Failure of parachute deployment 
Computer never sends command, trigger 
mechanism fails 2 1 PDR 
Redundant triggers: computer actuated, 
timer, mechanical accelerometer 
Aeroshell depressurizes during 
EDL 
Seal between aftbody and forebody fails 
(maybe after TPS jettison) 2 2 PDR 
Ground testing, add additional bolts to seal 
plate 
Recovery beacon fails to turn on 
Parts not reliable, computer never sends 
command 1 4 PDR Space proven parts 
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The risk management plan of combining the MLD with a top risk list and mitigation plan is 
certainly not the only method for incorporating the master logic diagram into a full management 
plan.  However, it combines the already systematic MLD with an easy it implement Top Risk 
List, making this process a good match for students.  As was detailed above, this was the plan 
chosen for Mars Gravity, and its results are detailed in the next section.   
5.5 Benefit of the MLD for the Mars Gravity Biosatellite 
The Mars Gravity program distributed the master logic diagram to the students of the Bus 
Engineering team for use in their subsystems and for understanding the big picture of the satellite 
program.  The response to the MLD was very positive, and students were able to learn about 
both objectives.  In meeting with the students after they had a chance to review the MLD and 
think about its application to their subsystem, they were asked the questions below.  Their 
responses are also included.   
 
• “What risks are in the MLD that you hadn't thought of before?  Did you learn anything 
from looking over the MLD and thinking about risks for your subsystem?” 
 
The students stated that the MLD helps to more clearly and logically show the potential 
problems, especially ones that the students had not thought of or did not think were important.  A 
common failure mode that students had not thought of was inter-related errors.  For example, a 
thermal student realized from the MLD that he needs to consider what would happen if a 
component fails, reducing its heat output, and unbalancing the thermal environment that he’s 
carefully designed for the nominal case.  Similarly, a student on the communications team had 
not considered operating temperatures for her hardware as a mission critical specification.  Now, 
as she considers hardware choices, she knows what parameters are important for the component.  
As discussed in the advantages of the MLD, it can show students that most of the systems are 
closely linked, and if one thing goes wrong, everything else is affected.   
Another student mentioned that she did not think of sensor failures on the propulsion system 
she had been working on.  She knows there are sensors feeding back information about 
temperature and pressure, but this communications/data aspect was more foreign to her, and 
therefore she had not thought about them failing and the affect that would have on the system.  
Electronics are also an area that students focus less on.  A student on the power subsystem noted 
that he had not yet thought about short or open circuits in the design of the solar panels and their 
 117 
distribution system.  More generally, it is important to note that each student, from freshmen to 
graduate students, who used the MLD recognized failure modes that they had not yet considered 
in their design.   
Finally, through the MLD, each student was exposed to the programmatic risks.  Often, risks 
at the program level are not shared or well communicated to the entire team, and having them 
documented, even in a separate page of the MLD, made students better aware of the risks that 
their student satellite faces because of the way the program is set up. 
In summary, the MLD has helped Mars Gravity increase awareness about failure modes at 
the technical and programmatic level while also helping to identify ways that the system can fail 
that the students had not yet considered.   
 
• “Do you think anything is missing from the MLD that's needed to show how the system 
can fail?” 
 
Since the MLD was reviewed before being distributed, it was expected that students would 
not be able to identify failure modes that were not in the MLD.  However, they were still asked 
to think about that issue.  As anticipated, none of the students had suggestions for other major 
risks that needed to be included, but a few graduate students suggested areas of further detail on 
their own subsystem, such as the types of mechanical and electrical failures for batteries.  These 
were not included to try to maintain the level of detail for the failures of components.   
 
• “What do you like about working with the MLD?” 
 
The students liked the structure of the MLD the most.  They thought it was easy to use, 
clearly showing the path of failures and that a failure’s flow to a particular subsystem can be 
mapped out in a logical manner.  The cause and effect chain also presented itself through this 
structure, so the students had a better picture of information flow through the system.  This could 
help determine the number of state-of-health sensors as well.  Students also thought training of 
ground operations crews would be easier using this satellite failure diagram. 
Students commented that the MLD makes design easier because it shows what is directly 
affected by a design choice.  By using the MLD when designing a system, the students know 
who they need to talk to in order to discuss changes.  This learning process through the master 
logic diagram was a benefit of the MLD that the students liked a lot. 
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• “What do you dislike about working with the MLD?” 
 
There were only a few minor comments about dislikes relating to the MLD.  First, the 
diagram uses the symbols commonly found in fault trees, and these symbols are probably new to 
students and not necessarily intuitive.  Even though a legend is provided, it was found that 
having to reference it was annoying, but manageable.  Another student mentioned that the MLD 
should take into account the magnitudes, or severity, of failure.  The MLD does not take that into 
account, but the top risk list does, and incorporating severity (and probability) into the MLD 
could be future work items.   
As expected, one student mentioned that the MLD is “kinda scary” due to the number of 
failure modes and the fact that it is recursive, but she also thought it was very useful.  Some 
students to want to be able to solve all of the problems shown, but they have neither the time nor 
the knowledge to do so.  On the other hand, one student wanted even more information on every 
possible way his subsystem could fail, but that request for information has to be balanced with 
the apprehension of providing too much information and the need of applicability to all satellites.  
The size of the MLD can be overwhelming, but having students browse the whole thing while 
only focusing on their subsystems can hopefully prevent the MLD from being too overpowering. 
From this feedback from the students on Mars Gravity, it is apparent that the MLD helps 
students see failure modes in their subsystems.  Each subsystem had risks that were identified 
because of the MLD, and plans were made within the subsystem teams to mitigate the risks that 
the MLD caught.  For example, interface failures were better understood after using the MLD, 
and this risk was mitigated through better communication at team meetings about inter-
subsystem issues.  Meetings across systems, such as between payload and bus, were also begun 
to facilitate communication about thermal issues between the teams, including plans to mitigate 
risks related to the payload-bus thermal system.  Data and software interfaces were another part 
of the system that students were not familiar with in terms of failure modes.  At the system level, 
an effort was started to better understand software requirements, making sure to recognize to the 
requirements that affected more than one system.  This information was then discussed with the 
students on each team so that they were more aware of data and software failure modes in 
relation to their subsystem.   
The most important comment to note is that the students liked working with the MLD.  It 
provided them a clear picture of failures and brought risks to their attention that they had not 
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considered.  Risk management is often viewed as an overwhelming and tedious task, but it seems 
that the MLD is not viewed as such by students.  Therefore, the MLD should be used for student-
run small satellites because it is easy to implement, and it is useful for students to identify risks 
in a logical manner.  
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Chapter 6: Summary and Recommendations  
6.1 Summary and Contributions 
This thesis discussed programmatic and technical risks related to student-run satellites and 
suggested a new way for university programs to do risk management, including failure mode 
identification.   
Chapter 1 outlined the motivation for the thesis – student groups need to do risk 
management to maintain cost and schedule as well as to learn an important part of systems 
engineering.  Chapter 2 overviewed the steps of risk management, and the programmatic 
differences between small satellites and industry satellites were investigated.  Then, unique risks 
facing university satellites were identified and discussed; these risks included funding and 
competition, experience, staff, direction, schedule, documentation, and recruitment.  Next, 
technical risks for university and industry satellites were researched, and the two sets of results 
were compared.  It was seen that it is still hard to compare student and industry satellite failures 
because of the lack of student satellite data, but from the available information, the power 
subsystem is often a failure mode for student satellites, potentially because of its high energy 
levels.  Universities should also utilize the failure rate information presented when planning their 
technical risk management plans.   
Chapter 3 presented methods used at other universities for risk management to see how 
schools tackle the problem of managing risk.  It was seen that many schools perform ad hoc risk 
management, if they do any risk management at all.   This section also discusses government risk 
management techniques, but those were shown to be too involved and time-consuming for 
student.  It was then determined that a framework for failure mode identification would help 
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universities maintain a consistent risk management process since student groups use informal 
and not well-planned risk management processes in many cases.  Suggestions for improvements 
of the programmatic and technical risks, including alternate platforms for space or near-space 
missions, were laid out as good options for student missions in relation to the problems presented 
thus far.   
Chapter 4 discussed multiple techniques for failure mode identification, and the MLD was 
chosen as a good method for risk identification for small satellite projects with engineers that 
lack experience.  The development of the MLD, along with its uses and restrictions, is presented.  
Finally, the benefits of the MLD for student satellite use are discussed.   
The MLD was applied to the Mars Gravity Biosatellite in Chapter 5.  First, a program 
overview was given to explain why the MLD was applied to this project and to show that any 
student project can utilize this risk management technique.  Then, the MLD was demonstrated to 
be better at identifying failure modes than other risk identification techniques used by Mars 
Gravity students, and the MLD matches the outcome for percentage of failures per subsystem for 
satellites that have flown.  Next, the MLD was applied to the Mars Gravity Biosatellite in detail, 
which demonstrated how the MLD can work for a real, complex student project.  In this 
application, the MLD is shown to reduce risk and increase failure mode awareness for the Mars 
Gravity project, and students also enjoyed working with the MLD on their subsystems.   
It has been shown that the MLD can help university satellite projects to implement a risk 
management process and identify both technical and programmatic risks.  Then, the MLD can be 
combined with other simple risk management techniques to mitigate and monitor the risks.  
Overall, the master logic diagram has proven to be a useful framework for risk identification that 
can be easily adapted for student-run, small satellites.   
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
While the work to date is sufficient to apply the MLD to university programs, some future 
work is suggested.  One deficiency of the current MLD is that it does not show which failure 
paths are more likely.  Probabilities of failure or quantitative risk assessments should be added to 
the MLD to determine the probability of the failure modes.  By associating probabilities with 
failures, even at a high level, the major drawback of the MLD would be eliminated.   
To proceed with measuring the utility of the MLD, a group of metrics should be set to assist 
in measuring the quality of the MLD for a student project.  This data would provide valuable 
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feedback in determining how the MLD is being applied, what is working well, and where it 
needs improvement.   
To make the MLD even more appropriate to all universities, the MLD should be tested at 
several other universities.  Dr. Helen Reed of Texas A&M generously offered their participation 
in testing out the MLD, but there was not enough time to complete that phase of the study.  This 
process would involve applying the MLD on a student project outside of MIT and then updating 
the MLD based on their suggestions.   
Once this update to the MLD is complete, an online community for using the MLD should 
be established.  It is important to keep control over the MLD template, but a means for feedback 
should be established.  One option would be to establish a licensing structure that allows the 
users to recommend adjustments to the template, and updated versions would be put online to 
share.  Also on this website, a repository for sharing information on failure modes and lessons 
learned should be created.   
For other areas of this study, it would be best to have information on all failures for small 
satellites, no matter what the final status of the satellite was.  This information would help to 
better understand how and why small satellites fail in order to see what processes might have 
prevented failure.  This information can also be compared to industry satellites so that best 
practices can be borrowed from their.  Failure information is difficult and time-consuming to get, 
but having a centralized, shareable collection of failure data would benefit all who do satellite 
projects at universities.     
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Appendix A: Master Logic Diagram Charts 
The complete MLD that was created for student satellites can be seen in this Appendix.  The 
master logic diagram is laid out in three levels.  The top level is for the end state failure, and the 
second level is for subsystem failure.  The third level is broken out for lower level failures, but 
some failures are on their own page solely because there was not enough room on the previous 
“Level 2” page.  There are 17 pages of technical failure modes, and there is one independent 
programmatic risk page.   
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Figure 12.  MLD for “No Data from Satellite” 
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Figure 13.  MLD for “No Acquisition of Signal” 
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Figure 14.  MLD for “Power Failure” 
 129 
 
Figure 15.  MLD for “C&DH Failure” 
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Figure 16.  MLD for “ADCS Failure” 
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Figure 17.  MLD for “Thermal Failure” 
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Figure 18.  MLD for “Structural Failure” 
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Figure 19.  MLD for “GNC Failure” 
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Figure 20.  MLD for “Propulsion Failure” 
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Figure 21.  MLD for “Communication Equipment Fails” 
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Figure 22.  MLD for “Solar Panels Fail” 
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Figure 23.  MLD for “ADCS Mechanical Hardware Failure 
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Figure 24.  MLD for “Low Torque Capability 
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Figure 25.  MLD for “Internal Heat Decrease” 
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Figure 26.  MLD for “Thermal Hardware Failure” 
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Figure 27.  MLD for “Structural Mechanism Failure” 
 142
 
Figure 28.  MLD for “No Propulsive Maneuvers” 
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Figure 29.  MLD for “Programmatic Failures”
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